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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the federal courts' restrictive interpretation
of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, the most investor-friendly
express remedy that the "New Deal" Congress enacted. This judicial
erosion has resulted in a cause of action that extends to fewer
investors and is riddled with uncertainty at the pleading stage. The
authors posit that recent federal court decisions that have added
reliance as an element of Section 11 claims and rejected the use of
statistical evidence to prove tracing are inconsistent with Section
11's text and legislative history. The article then explores the
inconsistencies associated with pleading Section 11 claims that
"sound in fraud" by asserting that these claims should be extended
the longer statute of limitations available to such fraud-based
claims under the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002. The authors conclude
that the federal courts' focus on impeding vexatious litigation has
resulted in unduly restrictive judicial interpretations that have
altered the very natureof Section 11.
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INTRODUCTION

For the last thirty-five years, Congress and the federal courts
have restricted the scope of the federal securities laws, making it
more difficult for aggrieved investors to obtain redress. Supreme
Court decisions such as Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
InterstateBank of Denver, and Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.2 restricted the
reach of the securities laws and overturned decades of virtually
unanimous appellate court decisions.3 Congress, with the passage of
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (hereinafter "PSLRA"),4
enacted substantive provisions making it more difficult for investors
to prevail under the securities laws. At a time when investors have
lost record amounts of money due to fraud and corporate corruption,5
plaintiffs have sought refuge in perhaps the most consumer-friendly

1. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
2. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
3. See infra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
743, 758 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006) [hereinafter "PSLRA"].
5. Over the past decade, investors have seen a series of disclosure-based scandals
in violation of the securities laws from major corporations such as WorldCom, Tyco
Int'l, Global Crossing, Adelphia Communications, and perhaps most notably, Enron.
See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd.,
535 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D.N.H. 2007); In re Global Crossing Sec., 225 F.R.D. 436
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Enron Corp. Sec., 258 F. Supp. 2d 576 (S.D. Tex. 2003); In re
Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 285 B.R. 580 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). In 2009, Bernard
Madoff was convicted of perpetrating the largest investor fraud committed by a single
person in history. See Robert Frank & Amir Efrati, 'Evil' Madoff Gets 150 Years in
Epic Fraud, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB124604151653862301.html. The government alleged that his Ponzi scheme
caused investors to lose a total of thirteen billion dollars. Id. (quoting Madoffs
attorney disputing the government's calculations). Also in 2009, the SEC charged R.
Allen Stanford with "orchestrating a fraudulent, [$8] billion investment scheme"
where he allegedly used "false promises and fabricated historical return data to prey
on investors." Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges R. Allen Stanford, Stanford Int'l
Bank for Multi-Billion Dollar Investment Scheme (Feb. 13, 2009), available at
2
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009- 6.htm. In April 2010, the SEC filed charges
against Goldman, Sachs & Co. for allegedly "defrauding investors by misstating and
omitting key facts about a financial product tied to subprime mortgages," which
allegedly resulted in investor losses in excess of one billion dollars. Press Release,
SEC, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud in Structuring and Marketing of CDO
Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2010/2010-59.htm. This suit was settled for $550 million in July 2010, with
Goldman admitting it made "a mistake." Suzanne Craig & Kara Scannell, Goldman

Settles Its Battle with SEC - $550 Million Deal Ends Showdown That Shook Street,
WALL ST. J., July 16, 2010, at Al.

4

RUTGERS LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 63: 1

remedy under the federal securities laws: Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 (hereinafter "Section 11").6 However, Section 11, the last
refuge favorable to injured investors, is under siege.
This Article will focus on how the federal courts' restrictive
interpretation of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter
"Securities Act")7 has limited that statute's scope by increasing
plaintiffs' pleading and burden of proof requirements. The article will
begin by providing a brief historical progression highlighting several
pivotal cases that have severely limited the reach of the securities
laws. The article will then provide foundational information relating
to Section 11. Section IV focuses on a recent Eleventh Circuit
decision, subsequently followed by other courts, which added
"reliance" as an element of a plaintiffs Section 11 prima facie case. 8
That section posits that neither statutory text, legislative history, nor
federal jurisprudence support this approach. Section V examines a
recent Fifth Circuit ruling as well as other decisions that reject the
use of statistics to prove tracing in Section 11 claims. Lastly, Section
VI discusses the inconsistencies associated with pleading fraud under
Section 11, as courts apply the heightened pleading requirements
applicable to fraud-based claims yet deny these claims the benefit of
the applicable statute of limitations for fraud-based claims otherwise
available under the Securities Acts.
II. A HISTORY OF JUDICIAL RESTRICTION
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (hereinafter "Securities Exchange Act")9 are designed to protect
investors by promoting full disclosure of information necessary to
make informed investment decisions. 10 The Acts accomplish this goal
in part by providing investors private civil remedies against sellers of
securities and other responsible parties.11 Beginning almost thirty-

6. Securities Act of 1933, Ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 82 (1933)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006)) [hereinafter "Section 11"].
7. Securities Act of 1933, Ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (2006)) [hereinafter "Securities Act"].
8. APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs, Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1271-72 (11th
Cir. 2007) (requiring reliance as an element of a prima facie claim under Section 11).
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Ch. 303, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 78nn (2006)) [hereinafter "Securities
Exchange Act"].
10. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("One of [the Securities
Exchange Act's] central purposes is to protect investors through the requirement of
full disclosure. . . ."); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (stating that
the Securities Act is designed "to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions').
11. Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and The Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 227
(1933) (stating that "[c]ivil liability is imposed largely as one appropriate means of
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five years ago, courts began chipping away at the breadth of the
securities laws by imposing restrictive interpretations to private
rights of action. The Supreme Court, during its 1974 and 1975 terms,
narrowly construed the Securities Exchange Act, imposing stricter
requirements for plaintiffs to prevail.12 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores,13 a decision criticized by the dissent for its

"solicitousness for corporate well-being" and inconsistency with the
"traditions and the intent of the securities laws,"14 limited the
15
availability of Section 10(b) to purchasers and sellers of securities.
Likewise, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,16 the Court, rejecting the
SEC's view, held that plaintiffs must allege and prove scienter in
private Section 10(b) actions.17 Additionally, in other decisions, the
Supreme Court imposed new restrictions on claims brought under
Sections 14(a)18 and 16(b)19 of the Securities Exchange Act.20

accomplishing" disclosure of material information by issuers).

12.

See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term: NarrowingLiability Under the

1934 Act, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 255 (1976) (discussing how the Supreme Court
"restrict[ed] liability under the securities laws" by narrowly construing the Securities
Exchange Act).
13. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
14. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 731-51 (majority opinion). The Court's decision precluded "[t]hree
principal classes of potential plaintiffs" from bringing a claim under Section 10(b): (1)
individuals "who allege that they decided not to purchase [the security] because of an
unduly gloomy representation or the omission of favorable material[;]" (2)
"shareholders in the issuer who allege that they decided not to sell their shares
because of an unduly rosy representation or a failure to disclose unfavorable
material[;]" and (3) "shareholders . . . who suffered loss in the value of their
investment due to corporate or insider activities in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities which violate Rule lOb-5." Id. at 737-38.
16. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
17. Id. at 193. But see id. at 215-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (admonishing the
Court for interpreting Rule 10b-5 "restrictively and narrowly and thereby stultif[ying]
recovery for the victim").
18. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, provides an implied private right of action for material
misstatements or half-truths in a proxy statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2006); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2010); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964). The
Supreme Court interpreted this right of action by rejecting the view that a
misstatement of half-truth is "material" for purposes of Section 14(a) if a reasonable
'shareholder might consider it important. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Instead, the Court adopted the view that there must be "a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote." Id. (emphasis added).
19. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act "was designed to prevent a
corporate director or officer or the 'beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum' of a
corporation from profiteering through short-swing securities transactions." ForemostMcKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 234 (1976); see 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(b) (2006). Foremost-McKesson limited Section 16(b) by holding that "a beneficial
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More recently, the securities laws faced another round of assault
with decisions like CentralBank of Denver v. First InterstateBank of
Denver,21 Gustafson v. Alloyd Company,22 and the passage of PSLRA.
Prior to Gustafson, appellate courts were unanimous in the view that
Section 12(2), now Section 12(a)(2), of the Securities Act applied to
initial offerings, irrespective of whether they were public or private
in nature.23 In a five-to-four decision in Gustafson, the Supreme
Court overruled these decisions and limited Section 12(2) to public
offerings.24 Similarly, in another five-to-four decision in CentralBank
of Denver, the Supreme Court ruled contrary to "hundreds of judicial
and administrative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal
system"25 by holding there is no private aiding and abetting liability
under Section 10(b).26 As recently as 2008, the Supreme Court
continued its restrictive interpretation of Section 10(b), this time by
narrowly interpreting who can be found liable as a primary actor
under Section 10(b).27
The federal courts were not alone in this erosion of the federal
securities laws. Congress played its part by overriding President
Clinton's veto and enacting the PSLRA, which set forth heightened

owner must account for profits only if he was a beneficial owner 'before the purchase."'
423 U.S. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
20. For decades, this author has focused on this very subject. Ralph C. Ferrara &
Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisalof Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129
U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980); Marc. I. Steinberg, Implied PrivateRights of Action Under
FederalLaw, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33 (1979); Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and

Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
557 (1982); Marc. I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 after Naftalin
and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J. 163 (1979).
21. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
22. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
23. Id. at 602 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "every Court of Appeals to
consider the issue has ruled that private placements are subject to § 12(2)").
24. See id. at 584 (majority opinion).
25. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. at 192.
26. Id. at 191. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S.
Supreme Court Decisions on Federaland State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 489 (1995) (analyzing effects of Supreme Court cases interpreting federal
securities laws).
27. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 166-67
(2008). In Stoneridge, investors brought a securities fraud class action against
Charter, whose securities the investors held, and its suppliers. Id. at 152-53. Investors
sought to hold Charter's suppliers liable for knowingly entering into a fraudulent
"arrangement[] that allowed [Charter] to mislead its auditors and issue a [materially]
misleading financial statement affecting [Charter's] stock price." Id. The Court
concluded that Charter's suppliers were not liable under Section 10(b) because their
participation in the fraudulent arrangements was not disclosed to the public, and thus
the element of reliance could not be met. Id. at 161.
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pleading requirements,28 enhanced protection for publicly-issued,
forward-looking statements, 29 restrictions on discovery,30 and other
amendments making it more difficult for investors to prevail under
the securities laws.31 Three years later, Congress further limited the
reach of both federal and state securities laws by enacting the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (hereinafter
"SLUSA"), which generally preempts state-law class-action claims for
nationally traded securities listed on a regulated national
exchange.32 This pre-emption not only acts to bar state-law classaction claims brought by plaintiffs who have a private remedy under
federal law, but also bars class-action claims for which federal law
provides no private remedy.33
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006) (requiring plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claims to be
plead "with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind").
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (2006) (applying to Securities Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. §
77z-2 (2006) (applying to Securities Act); see Inst. Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564
F.3d 242, 254 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating PSLRA safe harbor provisions "immunize[ ] from
liability any forward-looking statement, provided that: the statement is identified as
such and accompanied by meaningful cautionary language; or is immaterial; or the
plaintiff fails to show the statement was made with actual knowledge of its
falsehood"); accord Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 243 (5th Cir. 2009).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006) (staying discovery for claims brought under
the Securities Exchange Act during pendency of defendant's summary judgment
motion); 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1) (2006) (staying discovery for claims brought under the
Securities Act during pendency of defendant's summary judgment motion).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(5) (prohibiting class action settlement agreements of
Securities Exchange Act claims to be filed under seal without a showing of good cause);
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(5) (prohibiting class action settlement agreements of Securities
Act claims to be filed under seal without a showing of good cause); 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(6) (setting limitations on attorneys' fees for Securities Exchange Act claims); 15
U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(6) (setting limitations on attorneys' fees for Securities Act claims); 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (providing sanctions for "abusive litigation" resulting from Securities
Exchange Act claims); 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c) (providing sanctions for "abusive litigation"
resulting from Securities Act claims); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) (noting that PSLRA 'limit[s] recoverable damages
and attorney's fees, provide[s] a 'safe harbor' for forward-looking statements, impose[s]
new restrictions on the selection of (and compensation awarded to) lead plaintiffs,
mandate[s] imposition of sanctions for frivolous litigation, and authorize[s] a stay of
discovery pending resolution of any motion to dismiss"); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened

Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA's InternalInformation Standardon '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 537, 587-88 (1998)
(explaining how many sections of the PLSRA contained identical amendments to both
the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act).
32. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998) [hereinafter "SLUSA"]; see JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (SLUSA aimed to
"prevent plaintiffs from seeking to evade the protections that Federal law provides
against abusive litigation by filing suit in State, rather than Federal, court.").
33. See Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 74, 83-84 (holding that SLUSA "pre-empts state-
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Unlike the narrowing of the Section 10(b) right of action, Section
11, until recently, had survived unabated and served as one of the
last plaintiff-friendly refuges for investors. Now, like its comrades,
Section 11 has fallen victim to judicially created restrictions which
threaten the statute's vitality.
III. THE SOLE SURVIVOR: SECTION 11 ENDURES THE INITIAL JUDICIAL
ONSLAUGHT
The Securities Act, designed to restore confidence in the United
States' financial markets following the stock market crash of 1929,34
aims to protect investors by requiring comprehensive disclosure in
public offerings of securities35 "The Act seeks not only to secure
law class-action claims" involving a nationally traded security "brought by plaintiffs
who have a private remedy under federal law" as well as to "claims for which federal
law provides no private remedy" so long as such alleged misconduct is "in connection
with the purchase or sale" of such security).
Perhaps the most puzzling restriction imposed on the securities laws in the
class-action setting is a Fifth Circuit decision from 2007 in which the court held that
plaintiffs were required to prove, at the class certification stage, an element of their
prima facie case - loss causation - for causes of action brought under Rule 10b-5. See
Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir.
2007) (holding that in Rule 10b-5 claims, plaintiffs must prove loss causation by a
preponderance of the evidence "at the class certification stage" when relying on the
fraud-on-the-market presumption). The Oscar decision has subsequently been followed
in numerous Fifth Circuit decisions. See, e.g., Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.
Ct. 856 (2011); Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indust., 579 F.3d 401, 407 n.9 (5th
Cir. 2009); Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir.
2009). These cases impede the litigation of meritorious securities fraud cases as
plaintiffs must bear the additional costs and time delays of a mini-trial in order to
qualify for class certification. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The

Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class CertificationMerits Trials in Securities Fraud
Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 330-34 (2010), for an excellent discussion of the
implications of Oscar.
34. Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Duncan V. Fletcher, Chairman
of the Banking and Currency Committee (Feb. 9, 1934), in S. REP. No. 73-792, at 2
(1934); 77 CONG. REC. 2910, 2914 (1933) (statements of Representative Greenwood)
("(Tihe necessity for this legislation to help restore confidence in our local banking
institutions is great."); Candida P. Jose, Note, Section 11 of the SecuritiesAct of 1933:

The DisproportionateLiability Imputed to Accountants, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 565, 565
(2002) (noting that the Securities Act was designed in part "to 'bring back investor
confidence"' following the stock market crash of 1929). Accord Michael A. Lynn, Note,

Fraudon the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 627, 630-31 (1982); Krista L. Trunquist, Note, Pleading Under Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2395, 2403-04 (2000).
35. See S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, ITEM No. 17 (J.S.
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 2001) ('"The purpose of this bill is to protect the
investing public and honest business. The basic policy is that of informing the investor
of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign
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accuracy in the information that is volunteered to investors, but
also . . . to compel the disclosure of significant matters which were

heretofore rarely, if ever, disclosed."36 The Securities Act effectuates
this disclosure regime by requiring companies to file a registration
statement with the SEC and to provide investors detailed
information in a prospectus before selling securities to the public.37
Section 11 creates a private cause of action for securities purchasers
based on material
against certain enumerated parties
statement. 38
in
a
registration
or
half-truth(s)
misrepresentation(s)
As stated by the Supreme Court, Section 11 "was designed to assure
compliance with the disclosure provisions of the [Securities] Act by

commerce and providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation."). "It should
give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence."
77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (message from the President - Regulation of Securities
Issues, Presented to the Senate, March 28, 1933), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, ITEM No. 3
('There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities
to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and
information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be
concealed from the buying public."); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Powers of

Supervising, Prosecuting,Advising, Declaring,and Informally Adjudicating, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 206 (1949) ("The major purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors
by requiring full and truthful disclosures.").
36. Shulman, supra note 11, at 227; Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561,
571 (1995) ("The primary innovation of the [Securities Act of| 1933 Act was the
creation of federal duties-for the most part, registration and disclosure obligationsin connection with public offerings."); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
195 (1976) (recognizing the Securities Act "was designed to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings'); see also Friedrich

Kessler, The American Securities Act and its Foreign Counterparts:A Comparative
Study, 44 YALE L.J. 1133, 1134 (1935) ("[T]he Securities Act tries to put at the disposal
of an investor all the information which is deemed necessary to enable him to form an
intelligent judgment regarding the merits of a security.").
37. Davis, supra note 35, at 206 (noting the purpose of the Securities Act is
accomplished "through registration statements which elaborately set forth the
necessary facts."); see Kessler, supranote 36, at 1134 ("[T]he Act tries to accomplish its
purpose by prescribing that no offer for the interstate sale of any security covered by
the Act can be made .. . unless a registration statement ... is filed with the [SEC] ...

'); William B Snyder, Jr., Comment, The Securities Act of 1933 After SLUSA Federal
Class Actions Belong in Federal Court, 85 N.C.L. REV. 669, 672-73 (2007) (stating the
Securities Act accomplishes its purpose "by requiring companies to file a registration
statement with the [SEC]").
38. See 15 U.S.C. §77k. Section 11 liability extends to: every person who signs the
registration statement; directors (or persons performing similar functions) or partners
of the issuer; accountants, engineers, or other professionals who provide expert
statements in the registration statement; and underwriters with respect to the
security at issue. Id.; see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381
(1983) ("Section 11 of the 1933 Act allows purchasers of a registered security to sue
certain enumerated parties in a registered offering when [materially] false or
misleading information is included in a registration statement.").
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imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who play a
direct role in a registered offering."39
To prevail on a Section 11 claim, a plaintiff need only prove: (1) a
requisite jurisdictional nexus; (2) that he/she acquired a security
pursuant to a registration statement; (3) that at the time the
registration statement became effective, it contained a materially
misleading statement or half-truth; and (4) that the claim was
brought within the applicable statute of limitations.40 These minimal
pleading requirements, combined with the virtually absolute strict
liability against the issuer and imposition of a stringent due diligence
defense upon other subject defendants, make Section 11 an attractive
weapon for aggrieved investors.41
Based on the plain language of Section 11, reliance on a
materially false or misleading statement is typically not an element
of the plaintiffs prima facie case. 42 As explained by the Supreme

39. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 381-82; see also In re Morgan Stanley Info.
Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d. Cir. 2010) (noting that under Section 11,
"[ilssuers are subject to 'virtually absolute' liability" and other potential defendants
"may be held liable for mere negligence"); J&R Marketing, SEP v. General Motors
Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)) (stating Section 11
"imposes strict liability on those who fail to include information required to be stated
in the registration statement") (internal quotation marks omitted); Wagner v. First
Horizon Pharmaceutical Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Herman
& MacClean, 459 U.S. at 382) (asserting that Section 11 liability is "virtually absolute,
even for innocent misstatements") (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Suprema
Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 269 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Section 11 is a virtually
absolute liability provision.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Krim v.
pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Section 11's liability provisions
are expansive-creating 'virtually absolute' liability for corporate issuers . . . .");
Sherman v. Network Commerce, Inc., 94 Fed. Appx. 574, 575 (9th Cir. 2004)
("[Section] 11 is a strict liability provision."); Romine v. Acxiom Corp., 296 F.3d 701,
704 (8th Cir. 2002) ("The issuer's liability is virtually absolute.") (internal quotation
marks omitted); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496-97
(7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that liability under Section 11 is "presumptive or
absolute").
40. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382; 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
41. See generally sources cited infra notes 46-47.
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k; see also Stark Trading v. Falconbridge Ltd., 552 F.3d 568,
573 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that Section 11 "does not require proof of reliance"); In re
Constar Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 784 (3d Cir. 2009) ("Since reliance is
irrelevant in a [Section] 11 case, a [Section] 11 case will never demand individualized
proof as to an investor's reliance . . . .); Sherman, 94 Fed. Appx. at 575 (stating "a
plaintiff need not allege or prove reliance" in a Section 11 claim); In re Initial Public
Offering Sec. Litig., 483 F.3d 70, 73 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Romback v. Chang, 355
F.3d 164, 169 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that Section 11 does not require plaintiffs to
allege reliance)); Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 628 n.13 (1st Cir.
1996) (noting Section 11 claims do not require allegations of reliance); Alpern v.
UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1541 (8th Cir. 1996) ("A claim under [Section] 11
does not require proof of reliance. . . ."); Comment, Civil Liability For Misstatements in

2010]

THE ASSA ULT ON SECTION 11

11

Court, "[ilf a plaintiff purchased a security issued pursuant to a
registration statement, he need only show a material misstatement
or omission to establish his prima facie case."43 In other words,
plaintiffs typically need not prove they relied on the registration
statement in order to prevail on a Section 11 claim.
The sole exception to this principle, the earnings statement
exception, requires plaintiffs to prove reliance where they bought the
security more than twelve months after the effective date of the
registration statement and the issuer had already distributed an
earnings statement. 44 Even where the plaintiff must prove reliance,
such reliance may be established without proving that the plaintiff
45
ever read the registration statement. Once a plaintiff proves its
prima facie case, liability against the issuer of the security is
virtually absolute, even for innocent misstatements.46 As to other
Section 11 defendants, a strict due diligence defense applies.47

Documents Filed under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 YALE L.J. 456,
459 (1935) [hereinafter "Civil Liability for Misstatements"] ("[Tihe plaintiff need not
prove reliance during at least the first year after registration ....

43.

Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.

44. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k ("If such person acquired the security after the issuer has
made generally available to its security holders an earning statement covering a
period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration
statement, then the right of recovery under this subsection shall be conditioned on
proof that such person acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in
the registration statement or relying upon the registration statement and not knowing
of such omission, but such reliance may be established without proof of the reading of
the registration statement by such person."); Marc I. Steinberg, SECURITIES
REGULATION 310 (revised 5th ed. 2009) (stating that except for the earnings statement
exception, reliance is not required to be proven by a plaintiff in a Section 11 action).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); Steinberg, supranote 44 (stating that "reliance [in such
situation] may be shown by means other than the actual reading of the prospectus");
Civil Liability For Misstatements, supra note 42, at 459 ("[E]stablishing reliance is not
insurmountable, for the plaintiff can do so without proving that he actually read the
statement which he alleges has misled him.").
46. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S at 382. Notably, a key defense provided under
Section 11, lack of loss causation, allows defendants to reduce their liability by proving
that the misstatement or half-truth at issue did not cause the financial loss. See infra
notes 202-208 and accompanying text.
47. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382 (stating non-issuer defendants "bear the
burden of demonstrating due diligence" in order to avoid liability); see also 15 U.S.C. §
77K(b)(3); In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 n.7 (2d Cir.
2010) ("[S]ection 11 provides several due diligence defenses available to non-issuer
defendants." (internal citation omitted)); Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky's
Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Defendants other than the issuer can avoid
liability by demonstrating due diligence[.]"); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d
1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[A]ccountants [i.e. experts] bear the burden of
demonstrating due diligence once a plaintiff shows a material misstatement or
omission in a registration statement."); In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 621
(9th Cir. 1994) ("Underwriters . . . may absolve themselves from liability by
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IV. PLAINTIFFS LEARN THEY CAN'T RELY ON SECTION 11 FOR
PROTECTION

This universal construction of Section 11 was met with
disagreement by the Eleventh Circuit's 2007 holding in APA
Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Technologies, Inc. (hereinafter "APA
Excelsior Ill").48 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit effectively added

reliance as a required element of a Section 11 claim.49 The court
concluded that Section 11 normally creates a presumption of reliance
but this presumption can be refuted.5o Ultimately, the court upheld
the district court's grant of summary judgment based on plaintiffs'
impossibility of reliance.51 While the court purported to limit its
holding to the "limited and narrow" facts of the case, other courts

have cited APA Excelsior III for the much broader proposition that
"an investor cannot recover under Section 11 where it is certain that
a purchase of the securities was motivated by factors other than the
registration statement."52 This section analyzes the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in APA Excelsior III and thereafter demonstrates
that statutory language, congressional history, and federal
jurisprudence all support the conclusion that reliance is not an
element of a Section 11 claim.
A.

The Court's Misplaced Reliance: APA Excelsior III

APA Excelsior III arose from litigation over a stock-for-stock
merger and acquisition between Xpedite Systems, Inc. (hereinafter
"Xpedite") and Premiere Technologies (hereinafter "Premiere").53
Plaintiffs included "investment funds and individuals who [were]
former shareholders of Xpedite," and two members of Xpedite's board

of directors.54 Defendant, Premiere, entered the picture when
Xpedite's board of directors sought "strategic alternatives to provide
establishing a 'due diligence' defense."); Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1106 (4th
Cir. 1988) (recognizing that Section 11 contains a due diligence defense).
48. APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs, Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1275-77 (11th
Cir. 2007).
49. See id. at 1271-72.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 1277. "What must be decided in this case is whether Congress
intended this presumption [of reliance] to apply . . . when reliance is rendered
impossible by virtue of a pre-registration commitment." Id. at 1272 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 1277; In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 647 (N.D. Ala.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec.
Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1162 n.34 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (stating that pursuant to APA
Excelsior III, reliance may have to be proved where "it appears from the face of the
complaint that a plaintiff cannot have actually relied on the registration statement").
53. APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs, Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1263 (11th Cir.
2007).
54. Id.
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an exit strategy for Xpedite's early investors."ss "Premiere proposed a
stock-for-stock merger acquisition . . . ."56 "As a condition of entering
the merger agreement,

. .

. Premiere required all Plaintiffs . . . to

execute stockholder agreements. Under these stockholder
agreements, Plaintiffs granted irrevocable proxies to Premiere to
vote their Xpedite stock in favor of the merger."57 Plaintiffs were
further required to execute affiliate letters which acknowledged that
Premiere was "under no obligation to file a registration statement
with the [SEC] covering the disposition of [their] shares."58
"More than two months later,... Premiere's registration
statement for the Xpedite merger became effective.

. .

. [AIll Xpedite

shareholders received 1.165 shares of Premiere common stock for
each share of Xpedite stock they owned."59 A few months after the
merger, "Premiere announced that it would have a shortfall in its
revenues, and that it would be taking a charge against its bad debt
reserves."60 This caused Premiere stock to decline twenty-eight
percent in one day and eventually decline sixty-nine percent from the
merger price.61 Plaintiffs alleged, among other claims, that the
decline in stock price was the result of numerous material
misstatements and omissions in the registration statement, and that
these defects violated Section 11.62 In defining the issue presented on
appeal, the court narrowed plaintiffs' appeal to a single question:
"Are sophisticated investors involved in an arms-length merger
transaction entitled to recover under Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933 if they make a legally binding investment commitment
months before the issuance of a defective registration statement?"63
The court held that Section 11 creates a "presumption of reliance"

55. Id.
56. Id. at 1264.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1264-65 (emphasis omitted) (quoting from affiliate letter).
59. APA Excelsior III, 476 F.3d at 1265. On February 27, 1998, a majority of both
Xpedite's and Premiere's shareholders voted to approve the merger.
60. Id.
61. Id. Premiere publicly announced the bad news on June 9th and 10th. On June
10th, Premiere's stock "dropped from $14.4375 per share to $10.375 per share." Id.
The downturn in Premiere's stock price was relatively temporary. Premiere's stock
price "rebounded to more than $20 per share-a 100% increase from the low in June
1998." Id. at 1265 n.1.
62. Id. at 1265. Plaintiff alleged Premiere's registration statement overstated its
prior acquisitions of and attempts to integrate two voice messaging businesses,
misrepresented the status and viability of "Orchestrate" (a comprehensive suite of
integrated communications services), and failed to disclose that Premiere was
experiencing dramatic declines in revenue from its business relationship with two
other entities. Id.
63. Id.
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which did not apply under the "limited and narrow" facts of the case,
and thus summary judgment was appropriate as plaintiffs could not
establish reliance.64 In reaching its decision, the court noted that
"Plaintiffs were sophisticated investors with due diligence rights, but
they failed to exercise them in any meaningful way."65
While the court specifically limited its holding to the "limited
and narrow" facts of the case, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis created
a new, unprecedented ground for summary judgment in Section 11
cases: impossibility of reliance. The court's analysis began with the
so-called "commitment theory": "once the decision is made and the
parties are committed to the transaction, 'there is little justification
for penalizing alleged omissions or misstatements which occur
thereafter and which have no effect on the decision."'66 The court
conceded that application of the commitment theory in Section 11
cases was an issue of first impression.67 As such, the court turned to
the statutory language of Section 11 and general principles of
statutory interpretation, thereby focusing on "the underlying purpose
of, and legislative intent behind, the statute."68 The court reasoned

that to the extent that the unambiguous language of Section 11
64. Id. at 1277.
65. Id. at 1264. The Court's reference to plaintiffs' due diligence rights is
problematic because Section 11 does not impose a duty of due diligence or even of
reasonable investigation upon purchasers of securities. Under Section 11, a buyer does
not even have to prove that he/she saw the registration statement to prevail. See 15
U.S.C. § 77k; Marc I. Steinberg, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 208-09 (5th ed.
2009) (noting that except for the "earning statement" exception, reliance is not
required under Section 11); Trunquist, supra note 34, at 2401-02 (stating a buyer need
not have seen the registration statement to collect damages under Section 11).
66. APA Excelsior III, 476 F.3d at 1267 (quoting SEC v. Nat'1 Student Mktg. Corp.,
457 F. Supp. 682, 703-04 (D.D.C. 1978)). The commitment theory originated from the
contract law principle that "securities are considered sold when the parties are
obligated to execute the transaction." Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. '21' Int'l Holdings,
Inc., 821 F. Supp. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v.
Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 891 (2d Cir. 1972) ("'Commitment' is a simple and direct
way of designating the point at which, in the classical contractual sense, there was a
meeting of the minds of the parties; it marks the point at which the parties obligated
themselves to perform .... ). The commitment theory originally defined the purchase
date in the context of Rule 10b-5 claims and has also been applied in Section 12(2)
cases. See Kahn v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 970 F.2d 1030, 1040-42 (2d Cir.
1992) (applying commitment theory to Rule 10b-5 case); Pell v. Weinstein, 759 F.
Supp. 1107, 1113-14 (M.D. Pa. 1991), affd, 961 F.2d 1568 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying the
commitment theory to Section 12(2)).
67. APA Excelsior III, 476 F.3d at 1267. Prior to APA Excelsior III, the district
court for the Southern District of New York determined that the commitment theory
did not apply to Section 11 causes of action because Section 11 grants a cause of action
"without any reference to a requirement, inference or presumption that the plaintiff
might have relied on the registration statement." Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 821 F.
Supp at 218.
68. APA Excelsior III, 476 F.3d at 1268.
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would lead to an unreasonable result for plaintiffs, statutory intent
may properly be considered.69
The court began by interpreting Section 11 to create a
presumption of reliance for any person who acquired a security
70
Rejecting the
pursuant to a defective registration statement.
a Section 11
of
element
an
not
plaintiffs' argument that reliance is
proven, but
be
not
claim, the court asserted that reliance need
conclusion
this
supported
court
rather, is typically presumed.71 The
a
conclusive
is
"there
stating
with reference to a leading treatise
prior
security
the
purchasing
presumption of reliance for any person
plaintiffs'
rejecting
In
to the expiration of twelve months."72
argument that reliance is not required under Section 11, the court
also cited to several ambiguous statements contained in the
congressional history that made glancing reference to reliance.73
Despite this "presumption of reliance" that applies to "any
person," the court nonetheless looked to whether the presumption
applied to the plaintiffs in the case at bar.74 The court determined
that the presumption did not apply to plaintiffs in this case,
reasoning that "Congress assumed that only those who acquire their
stock after the effective date of the registration statement would be
affected by material defects."75 In the court's view, congressional
history supported application of a presumption of reliance because
material misstatements and half-truths in a registration statement
"affect the market price and impel the purchase."76 Thus, the
presumption of reliance only applies to those who purchase securities
"at the time of or after the registration statement."77 The court
further supported its conclusion by referring to the earnings
69. Id. (citing United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 534-44
(1940)).
70. Id. at 1271.
71. Id. at 1272.
72. Id. at 1271 (quoting 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 7.3[4], at 351 (4th ed. 2002)) (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 1272 (citing H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., § 9 (1933) (where there is a defective
registration statement, "the public shall be presumed to rely" on it); S. REP. NO. 47,
73d Cong., at 4-5 (1933) (stating if there is a defective registration statement, "the
buyer presumably relies on it" and that he who "allows untruths to be published and
relied upon" should suffer the loss); H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., at 9 (1933) (noting
that Section 11 is enforced against "those who purport to issue statements for the
public's reliance")).
74. Id. at 1271-76.
75. Id. at 1273.
76. Id. at 1274 (citing H.R. No. 85, 73d Cong., at 10 (1933) ("The connection
between the statements made and the purchase of the security is clear, and, for this
reason, it is the essence of fairness to insist upon the assumption of responsibility for
the making of these statements.")).
77. Id.
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statement exception, which requires plaintiffs to prove reliance on
the defective registration statement where an earnings statement
covering at least twelve months following the registration statement
has been made publicly available.78 The underlying logic of this
exception is that once an annual earnings statement is issued, the
purchase price of the security acquired will be predicated upon the
earnings statement rather than on the defective registration
statement.79 The court analogized that plaintiffs' acquisition of
Premiere stock must have been based on factors other than the
content of the registration statement and thus the presumption of
reliance did not apply.so
Lastly, the court looked to the "tracing" requirement under
Section 11 to support its conclusion that the presumption of reliance
does not apply to plaintiffs who commit to purchase a security prior
to the issuance of the subject registration statement.81 To have
standing, "a plaintiff must be able to trace [his/her purchase of] stock
to the defective registration statement."82 The court reasoned that
plaintiffs could not trace their stock to the defective registration
statement because they had a binding commitment to purchase the
stock months before the registration statement became effective.83
Further, the Court said the stock could not have been purchased
pursuant to a registration statement because "under the affiliate
letters, no registration statement was even required as to [the
affected] shares."84

78. Id. at 1275; H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong. at 41 (1934). For further discussion
on the post-earnings statement see infra notes 95, 102-105 and accompanying text.
79. APA Excelsior III, 476 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners,
Inc., 191 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., at
41 (1934)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1276.
82. Id.; see infra notes 142-148 and accompanying text.
83. APA Excelsior III, 476 F.3d at 1263. The court conceded "that plaintiffs in one
sense 'acquired' their stock only after consummation of the merger and after the
registration statement was filed." Id. at 1276 n.6. This should have been sufficient to
meet the tracing requirement, which only requires a plaintiff to prove his/her
securities were issued pursuant to the allegedly faulty registration statement.
84. Id. at 1276. The affiliate letters entered into between plaintiffs and Premiere
did not alleviate Premiere of its duty to file a registration statement for the newly
issued securities. Section 5 of the Securities Act requires a seller of securities to file a
registration statement before offering any security for sale unless the securities offered
come within a recognized exemption. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006); Riley v. Simmons, 45
F.3d 764, 774 (3d Cir. 1995). See generally Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (delineating which parties are able to claim
exemption under the statute).

2010]

THE ASSAULT ON SECTION 11

17

B. Follow the Leader: Courts Rely on APA Excelsior III to
FurtherRestrict the Scope of Section 11
While the Eleventh Circuit was the first court to hold that
reliance is a required element of a Section 11 claim, its decision in
APA Excelsior III has already had far reaching impact as several
district courts have followed and expanded on the Eleventh Circuit's
holding.85 For example, courts have applied the logic from APA
Excelsior III to Section 11 claims involving Rule 144A/Exxon Capital
exchange transactions.86 In these cases, plaintiffs typically purchase
unregistered bonds prior to the issuance of a registration statement
and then trade the unregistered bonds for registered bonds issued
pursuant to a valid registration statement. 87 Accordingly, once the
investor acquires the registered bonds, they should be entitled to
recovery under Section 11 for material misstatements or half-truths
in the registration statement. However, in In re HealthSouth Corp.,88
the defendant argued that APA Excelsior Ills "irrevocable
commitment theory" precluded plaintiffs' Section 11 claim because
plaintiffs purchased their unregistered bonds before the filing of a
registration statement. 89 The court agreed with the defendant, citing
APA Excelsior III for the broad position that "a registration
statement cannot be the basis for an investment decision where an
85. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 647 (N.D. Ala.
2009) (Finding investors who exchanged unregistered bonds for registered bonds were
precluded from asserting claims under Section 11 because "the decision to own a
registered bond occurred when the investors decided to purchase the unregistered
bond[s]. . . . [And] before the filing of the registration statement." (emphasis in
original)); In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(citing APA Excelsior III, L.P. v. Premiere Techs, Inc., 476 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2007),
for the proposition that reliance is impossible where plaintiffs are irrevocably
committed to purchase securities prior to the issuance of the registration statement);
In re Levi Strauss & Co. Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 965, 976-77 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(following Refco's interpretation of APA ExcelsiorIll).
86. A Rule 144A/Exxon Capital exchange "transaction is a capital raising
technique where an issuer first sells securities to an initial purchaser in a private
offering exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act." In re Levi
Strauss & Co. Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d at 975 n.11. The investor "is then authorized
to sell the unregistered securities to [Qualified Institutional Buyers] in a private
transaction similarly exempt from registration under Rule 144A." Id. The Rule 144A
offering is then followed by an SEC-registered exchange offering where the issuer
offers to exchange the Rule 144A securities for similar, freely resalable registered
securities. Id. See generally Steinberg, supra note 44, at 294-99; Marc I. Steinberg &
Daryl L. Lansdale, Jr., Regulation S and Rule 144A- Creatinga Workable Fiction in an
Expanding Global Securities Market, 29 INT'L LAW. 43 (1995).
87. See cases cited supra note 85 and accompanying text.
88. In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616 (N.D. Ala. 2009).
89. Id. at 647 (quoting APA Excelsior III, 476 F.3d at 1277).
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investor made its investment decision before the registration
statement has been filed."90 The Court noted "[e]very court that has
addressed this issue after APA Excelsior [III] has agreed that
plaintiffs who acquired registered bonds through a voluntary
144A/Exxon Capital exchange are precluded from asserting claims
under Section 11."91 These cases have all cited and adopted the
arguments from APA Excelsior III, but ultimately resolved the cases
on grounds of materiality and traceability.92
C. How Presumptuous: The Court's Incorrect Conclusion that
Section 11 Presumes Reliance
While the court in APA Excelsior III attempted to justify its
holding with tenuous references to congressional history, the court's
true rationalization is apparent in its assertion that plaintiffs were
not entitled to the presumption of reliance "as a matter of common
sense."93 This argument resonates with tones of judicial activism.94
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 647 (citing In re Levi Strauss & Co. Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 965, 97677 (N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633-37 (S.D.N.Y.
2007)).

92. In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. at 647 (resolving the case as an
issue of standing); In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d at 633-37 (resolving the
case as an issue of materiality).
93. 476 F.3d at 1273-74. ("First, as a matter of common sense, Plaintiffs are not
entitled to the presumption in light of the timing of their investment decision and
commitment . . . . Thus, as a matter of common sense reasoning, the presumption

should only apply to those who purchase securities at the time of or after the
registration statement." (emphasis added)). Note that Section 11(e) provides a defense
of lack of loss causation, i.e., the defendant may prove that the disclosure deficiency
did not cause the financial loss. See, e.g., Akerman v. Oryx Commc'ns, Inc., 609 F.
Supp. 363, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1987). The court in APA
Excelsior III briefly recognized that its "rationale encompasse[d] the lack of causation
analysis the district court employed and, therefore," it was not "necessary to
separately address the district court's alternative holding that Plaintiffs could not
establish loss, causation and damages." 476 F.3d at 1277 n.8. This would have been a
more appropriate ground for dismissal and would have avoided the necessity of the
court's analysis focusing on reliance as an element of a Section 11 claim.
94. While there is little consensus on the meaning of the term "judicial activism,"
the term has been used to describe a decision that reaches "an interpretation that
exceeds a text's original meaning or its plain language[.]" Caprice L. Roberts, In

Search of JudicialActivism: Dangers in Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REV.
567, 574 (2007); see Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an 'Activist" Court?: The
Commerce Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO.

L. REV. 1275,

1275-80 (2002);

Erwin

Chemerinsky, Conservatives Embrace JudicialActivism in CampaignFinance Ruling,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/22/opinion/
la-oe-chemerinsky22-2010jan22.

In order to prevent what the court saw as an

"unreasonable result" that defied "common sense," the court reached an interpretation
of Section 11 that exceeded the statute's text and original meaning. See APA Excelsior
III, 476 F.3d at 1268 ("[To the extent that we believe it would lead to an unreasonable
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The fundamental error with the Eleventh Circuit's holding is not
only its finding that plaintiffs were not entitled to an irrefutable
presumption of reliance, but more broadly, its finding that reliance is
a required element in a Section 11 claim.95 The following discussion
explains how this holding is inconsistent with existing case law,
statutory language, and statutory history.
1. A Prudent Interpretation: A Review of Federal
Jurisprudence
Of the other federal appellate courts that have discussed reliance
in the context of Section 11 claims, virtually all have stated either in
holding, dicta, or analysis that proof of reliance is not required.96 Not
only are the circuit courts virtually unanimous in their consensus
that reliance is not a required element in a Section 11 claim, but the
Supreme Court also appears to be in accord with these federal
circuits.97 In addressing the purpose of Section 11, the Supreme
Court proclaimed "[i]f a plaintiff purchased a security issued
pursuant to a registration statement, he need only show a material
misstatement or omission to establish his prima facie case. Liability
result for Plaintiffs to obtain refuge under Section 11 on the facts as presented in the
case . . . ." (emphasis added)). The court's decision appears to have been influenced by
its belief that plaintiffs should not be able to recover under Section 11 because they
were sophisticated and failed to perform due diligence. See id. at 1277. The court noted
that, while not essential to its holding, it was pertinent that plaintiffs had access to
inside information and had an opportunity to learn of potential problems with
defendant Premiere's business relationships and products. Id. at 1277. The court also
noted that "Plaintiffs were sophisticated investors with due diligence rights, but they
failed to exercise them in a meaningful way." Id. at 1264. While these facts are
irrelevant under Section 11, they appear to have been relevant to the court's decision.
95. Pursuant to the post-earnings statement exception, the only instance where
reliance is an element of a Section 11 claim is when a company has issued an earnings
statement covering at least twelve months following the date of the registration
statement. See sources cited supra note 44.
96. Stark Trading v. Falconbridge Ltd., 552 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2009)
("plaintiffs' claim under [Slection 11 ... does not require proof of reliance."); In re
Constar Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 784 (3d Cir. 2009) ("reliance is not an
element under § 11"); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 483 F.3d 70, 73 n.1 (2d Cir.
2007) (quoting Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 169 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Neither
Section 11 nor Section 12(a)(2) requires that plaintiffs allege . . . reliance . . . .");
Sherman v. Network Commerce, Inc., 94 Fed App'x. 574, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976) ('Because [Section] 11 is a strict liability
provision . . . a plaintiff need not allege or prove reliance."); Rosenzweig v. Azurix
Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 872 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[Section] 11 ... imposes liability without a
showing of fraud or reliance"); Alpern v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1541 (8th
Cir. 1996) ("A claim under [Section] 11 does not require proof of reliance . . . .");
Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 628 n.13 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating
"Section 11... claims do not require allegations of scienter and reliance").
97. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.
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against the issuer of a security is virtually absolute."98 The Supreme
Court's unambiguous language in Herman & MacLean provides
strong support that reliance is not an element of a plaintiffs prima
facie case.99
2.

Misstatement or Omission? Section 11 Omits Any
Reference to Reliance

In all statutory construction cases, as set forth by the Supreme
Court, "[t]he first step 'is to determine whether the language at issue
has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular
dispute in the case."'oo The inquiry ceases "if the statutory language
is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent."101 When performing this analysis, the plain language of
Section 11 leaves little room for interpretation. Other than the
earnings statement exception, nothing in the text of Section 11
mentions reliance as an element of a Section 11 claim.102 The fact
that Congress specifically enumerated a single instance where
reliance is required lends persuasive support to the proposition that
reliance is not otherwise necessary to establish a Section 11 claim.103
To read otherwise would make the post-earnings exception
redundant. If one is to assume that recovery under Section 11 is
always conditioned upon proof of reliance, then the earnings
statement exception would be unnecessary. 104

D. Relying on History to Disprove Reliance
While the plain language of Section 11 makes clear that reliance
is not an element of a Section 11 claim, further support can be found
by placing the statute's words in their proper context, by reference to
legislative history.os Significantly, the original language of Section

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (quoting Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). The language of a statute controls when it is
sufficiently clear in its context. E.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201; accord Cent.
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 174-75
(1994) (stating that "[t]he ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the
scope of liability created by a particular section of the Securities Act must rest
primarily on the language of that section" (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653
(1988))).
101. Barnhart,534 U.S. at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
103. See sources cited infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
104. See id.
105. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972) ("[W]hile the
clear meaning of statutory language is not to be ignored . . . it is essential that we
place the words of a statute in their proper context by resort to the legislative
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11 made no reference to the element of reliance. The post-earnings
exception was not contained in Section 11 as originally enacted by
Congress in 1933.106 Section 11 was amended to include this
language in 1934, at the same time Congress enacted the Securities
Exchange Act.107 This fact is significant for two reasons. First, the
language used in Section 11 can be compared to analogous provisions
in the 1934 Act to better understand Congress' intent. Second, a
thorough review of the 1934 congressional record reveals that
Congress contemplated adding reliance as an element of Section 11
claims and rejected the idea.108
Comparing Section 11 to Section 18 of the Securities Exchange
Act (hereinafter "Section 18")109 also provides important insight.
Section 18 is the analogous provision to Section 11, imposing liability
upon "any person" who makes a materially false or misleading
statement in an "application, report, or document filed pursuant to"
the Securities Exchange Act. 110 Unlike Section 11, a Section 18 cause
of action is predicated upon a showing of reliance.111 According to the
plain language of the statute, a potentially liable party's liability is
limited "to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or
misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have
purchased or sold a security."112 As one appellate court observed,

'The requirements under [S]ection 11 stand in stark contrast to those
of [Section 18(a) of] the [Securities Exchange Act] which include a
showing of reasonable reliance."113
During the House debate, Representative Rayburn114 explained
history.").
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
107. See id.
108. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2006).
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 283 (3d
Cir. 2006) ("Section 18 creates a private remedy for damages resulting from the
)
purchase or sale of a security in reliance upon a false or misleading statement ....
(emphasis added); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and

UnwarrantedExtension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359,
401 (1995) ("Congress expressly permitted investors to recover ... without a showing
of reliance under section 11 of the 1933 Act, but then required under section 18 of the
Act that the investor prove direct reliance on the 1934 Act documents filed with the
SEC.").
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78(r) (2006) (emphasis added). Section 18 further states that
liability is limited to "damages caused by such reliance." Id. (emphasis added).
113. In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 273 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004).
114. Samuel Rayburn, a Democratic congressional representative from Texas,
served in the United States House of Representatives from 1913 to 1961. Samuel
Rayburn Biography, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index-rOO0082 (last visited Nov. 12,
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that, compared to Section 18, "[tlhe Securities Act of last year and its
liability provisions [e.g., Section 11] go a great deal further."115 Had
Congress intended for reliance to be an element of a Section 11 claim,
there would have been no reason to use different language in Section
18.116 The same Congress passed both Section 11 and Section 18.117

Had Congress understood Section 11 as requiring proof of reliance, it
would have used identical language in Section 18 with the
understanding that reliance was required under both Acts. However,
Congress chose to use different language in Section 18 that explicitly
required proof of reliance. Accordingly, Section 18 illustrates that
when Congress desired reliance to be an element of a cause of action,
it knew how to state so expressly.118 Conversely, when Congress

2010). He acted as chairman on the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
during the years the Securities Act and Exchange Act were passed and was later
elected as Speaker of the House. Id.
115. 73 CONG. REC. 8040 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item No. 8, at 8040
(J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973). Representative Rayburn's statements
were made in disagreement to an amendment that would have predicated Section 18
liability upon a showing that the defendant knew the materially misleading statement
was false. Id. at 8039-40. Representative Rayburn stated, "[w]e have been passing
laws here which went a great deal further than this." Id. at 8039. "A man has to prove
[under Section 18] not only that the statement was false and misleading but that he
relied on the statement." Id. When challenged about what statutes "went a great deal
further," Rayburn responded, "The Securities Act of last year and its liability
provisions." Id. at 8040.
116. Notably, initial bills proposed in both the House and Senate did not include
reliance as an element of a Section 18 claim. See H.R. 7852, 73d Cong. § 17 (1934),
reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES

EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item No. 24, at 31-32 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar
eds., 1973) (stating civil liability for misleading statements would extend to "[a]ny
person . . . who shall have purchased or sold a security the price of which may have
been affected by such statement"); H.R. 7855, 73d Cong. §17 (1934) reprinted in 10
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT

OF 1934, Item No. 25, at 32 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) (same);
H.R. 8720, 73d Cong. § 17 (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item No. 28, at 42-

43 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) (providing a cause of action
extending to "[a]ny person who shall have purchased or sold a security to which such
statement related"); S. 2693, 73d Cong. § 17 (1934), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,

Item No. 34, at 31-32 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) (creating a cause
of action for "[any person . . . who shall have purchased or sold a security the price of
which may have been affected by such [misleading] statement").
117. The 73rd Congress served from 1933-1935, the years in which the Securities
Act and Securities Exchange Act were passed. See House History, OFFICE OF THE
CLERK: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/art-history/house_
history/index.html?cong-73 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
118. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-34 (1975)
(comparing the language of Section 10(b) to the parallel antifraud provision in the
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expressly added reliance as an element of a Section 18 claim, it could
have modified the language of Section 11 to mirror that of Section 18,
but declined to do so.
E. A Failed Proposition:Congress Rejects Reliance as an
Element of a Section 11 Claim
Further review of the congressional history of the Securities Act
and the 1934 amendments to the Securities Act makes clear that
Congress contemplated, but rejected, the idea of adding reliance as
an element to Section 11 claims.
In 1933, there were two proposals that would have included a
presumption of reliance in Section 11 claims. The first, House Bill
4314, introduced by Representative Rayburn, contained a provision
stating that "the public shall be presumed to rely upon the
representation set forth in the said statement."119 The Investment
Bankers Association also proposed an amendment that would have
added a rebuttable presumption of reliance to Section 11 claims.120
Both of these proposals were ultimately rejected in favor of the
adopted language, which made no reference to the element of
reliance. 121
In 1934, while crafting the Exchange Act, several members of
Congress proposed amendments to alter Section 11. On May 4, 1934,
Senator Fletcherl22 proposed amendments to the Senate bill that
Securities Act, Section 17(a), and recognizing that had Congress wanted the two
provisions to have the same meaning, it would have adopted the same language used
in the Securities Act). In addressing express versus implied rights of action under the
securities laws, the Supreme Court again recognized that had Congress desired
analogous provisions to reach similar results, it would have adopted similar language.
See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20-21 (1979) ("Congress
provided an express damages remedy for misrepresentations contained in an
underwriter's registration statement in [Section] 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
and for certain materially misleading statements in [Section] 18(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 'Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a private
damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly."') (quoting Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979)).
119. H.R. 4314, 73d. Cong. § 9 (1933), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item No. 22, at 19
(J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar 1973).
120. Securities Act: Hearing on S. 875 Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency,
73d Cong. 335 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item. No. 21, at 340 (J. S. Ellenberger
& Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) (purchasers of securities "shall be presumed to have
relied upon the representations set forth in the registration statement with respect
thereto, unless the contrary is proved").
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
122. Duncan Fletcher, Democratic Senator from Florida, served from 1909 to 1936.
Duncan Fletcher Biography, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(last
CONGRESS,
http:/bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=FOOO200
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would have added reliance as an element of Section 11 claims.123 In
an explanatory statement of his proposed amendments, Senator
Fletcher stated that the amendment to Section 11 would "limit[ ]
recovery . . . to those persons who acquire securities in reliance on

such misstatements or omissions."124 Subsequently, on May 12,
Senator Fletcher proposed a new set of amendments, which
eliminated the reliance requirement and instead added the earnings
statement exception.125 This new set of amendments came with a
new explanatory statement that no longer interpreted Section 11 as
requiring proof of reliance.126 Another legislator, Senator Walcott,127
proposed an amendment that would have altered Section 11 "by
striking out 'acquiring' and inserting in lieu thereof 'who, in reliance
on such registration statement ... acquires."'28 A vote was taken,
and Senator Walcott's amendment was rejected in favor of Senator
visited Nov. 12, 2010). He served on the Committee on Banking and Currency during
the 73rd Congress, the same term the Securities Exchange Act was passed. Id.
123. Senator Fletcher's Proposed Amendment to S. 3420, 73d Cong. § 206 (1934),
reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item. No. 38, at 6 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar 1973)
(amending the first paragraph of Section 11(a) "by striking out the word 'acquiring'
and inserting in lieu thereof 'who in reliance on such statement or omission,
acquires').
124. 78 CONG. REC. 8185 (1934) (emphasis added), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
Item No. 10, at 8185 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).
125. Id. at 8668.
SEC. 206. (a) Section 11 (a) of such act is amended by adding, after the last
line thereof, the following new sentence:
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally
available to its security holders an earning statement covering a period
of at least 12 months beginning after the effective date of the
registration statement, then the right of recovery under this subsection
shall be conditioned on proof that such person acquired the security
relying upon such untrue statement in the registration statement or
relying upon the registration statement and not knowing of such
omission, but such reliance may be established without proof of the
reading of the registration statement by such person.
Id.
126. Id. at 8669 (removing the following paragraph that was present in the May 7,
1934 explanatory statement at 8185: "Amendment to Section 11 (a): This amendment
limits recovery under section 11 for damages resulting from misstatements or
omissions in registration statements to those persons who acquire securities in
reliance on such misstatements or omissions.").
127. Frederic Walcott, Republican Senator from Connecticut, served in the Senate
from 1929 to 1935. Frederick Collin Walcott Biography, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index
=W000032 (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
128. 78 CONG. REC. 8702 (1934) (emphasis added), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
Item No. 10, at 8702 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).
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Fletcher's amendment, which did not condition recovery under
Section 11 upon a showing of reliance. 129
Also printed into the congressional record on May 12 was a letter
from James M. Landis,130 Commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission, addressing several of the proposed amendments.131 In
addressing amendments that purported to include reliance as an
element of Section 11, Landis stated, "I do not believe that the
requirement of reliance is consonant with the present-day methods of
distributing securities in this country."132 He went on to state that
"the requirement of reliance, especially with the burden of proof upon
the purchaser, will place altogether too hopeless a burden upon any
attempt at recovery by the purchaser of a security."133 In commenting
on suits against responsible parties, such as a subject issuer's
directors, officers, or experts, Landis stated that "the only practical
object of the provision [including reliance as an element of Section
11] is to relieve responsible persons of the major possibility of a
successful action against them."134
On May 30, 1934, after much debate, the House and Senate
agreed to recommend to their respective Houses an amendment to
Section 11 using the language of the Fletcher amendment, which
included the post-earnings exception but did not include reliance as
an element for Section 11 claims.135 This language was eventually
codified and added to Section 11. Senator Byrnes explained the
justification for not requiring reliance until a 12 months' earnings
statement is made public:
When an issue of securities is proposed, a banking house will
investigate the financial statement of the corporation. Based upon
the statements contained in the registration statement of the
corporation, a banking house will offer the securities at a certain

129. Id. at 8708.
130. James M. Landis was acting Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission
in 1934 when he provided his opinion on the proposed amendments to S. 3420. James
M. Landis Biography, JFK PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM, http://www.jfklibrary.
org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Archives+and+Manuscripts/Kennedy.john+F/jfk_pr
ez/whstaff/falandis wh.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). He went on to serve as
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1935 to 1937 and then
acted as Dean of Harvard Law School. Id.
131. 78 CONG. REC. 8714-17 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item No. 10, at
8714-17 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).
132. Id. at 8716.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. S. DOC. No. 185 (1934) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item No. 13, at
9941 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).
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price. Therefore, the market value is fixed by the false statement of
the corporation. The individual investor relies upon the
investigation made by the banker. It is fair to assume that this
situation continues until such time as the corporation makes
available a statement showing its earnings for 12 months. Then the
market value is influenced by the statement of actual earnings and
not by the statements contained in the registration statement,
which deceived the underwriter or banker and the investor. 136
These statements illustrate that Congress was not focused on an
individual's reliance on the misleading statements or half-truths, but
rather on how such statements affect the value of the subject
security.
The congressional record reflects an extended debate over
whether reliance should be added as an element to all Section 11
claims.137 The position adopted by both the House and Senate, and
subsequently codified, rejected reliance as a requirement for Section
11 claims. Based on the statutory language of Section 11,138 the
traditional interpretation of Section 11 by federal courts,139 and the
detailed congressional history,140 it is abundantly clear that the
Eleventh Circuit, as well as other courts that have followed its
lead,141 is incorrect in holding that reliance is an element of a Section
11 claim.
V.

TRACING BACK TO THE INITIAL ATTACK

The addition of reliance as an element of a Section 11 claim is a
recent illustration of the judiciary's restrictive interpretation of the
securities laws. However, the judiciary's initial attack on Section 11
came over thirty years ago with the introduction of the "tracing"
requirement. A claim under Section 11 is available to "any person
acquiring such security."142 In 1967, the Second Circuit, after
rejecting a broader reading, interpreted this phrase narrowly as
limiting the availability of Section 11 to individuals "acquiring a
security issued pursuant to the registration statement."143 As
described by one court, Section 11 is available "not only to those who
136. 78 CONG. REC. 10186 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES ExCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item No. 14, at
10186 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).
137. See sources cited supra notes 114-36 and accompanying text.
138. Section 11, supra note 6.
139. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part IV.E.
141. See cases cited supra notes 48-52, 88-92.
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (emphasis added).
143. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1967) (rejecting the broader
interpretation that Section 11 is available to anyone "acquiring a security of the same
nature as that issued pursuant to the registration statement") (emphasis added).
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purchased their stock during the relevant public offerings, but also to
aftermarket purchasers as long as the stock is 'traceable' back to the
relevant public offering."144 Virtually every circuit has adopted the
tracing requirement for aftermarket purchasers.145 Thus, to prevail
on a cause of action under Section 11, a plaintiff must plead, and
eventually prove, that the securities he/she purchased were issued
pursuant to the allegedly defective registration statement. 146 Where
stock has exclusively entered the securities markets via a single
public offering, all holders of that stock will fulfill the tracing
requirement as a matter of logic.147 However, where there is a
mixture of pre- and post-registration stock, such as securities issued
by means of private offerings or subsequent registered offerings, as
well as stock sold pursuant to the subject registration statement,
proof of tracing is problematic. 148
The already burdensome task of proving tracing has become
even more onerous as a growing number of courts have rejected the
use of statistical evidence to prove tracing.149 This is true even when
the pool of stock on the market contains 99.85% registered stock.150

144.

Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 2005).

145. Accord APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs, Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1271
(11th Cir. 2007) (noting that plaintiffs must be able to "trace" their securities to the
defective registration statement); In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d
256, 274 n.7 (3rd Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the applicability of the tracing requirement
in Section 11 claims); Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 498 (5th Cir. 2005)
(stating Section 11 is available to aftermarket purchaser whose "shares are traceable
to the registration statement in question"); DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 178
(2d Cir. 2003) (holding that Section 11 applies to "aftermarket purchasers who can
trace their shares to an allegedly misleading registration statement"); Lee v. Ernst &
Young, LLP, 294 F.3d 969, 978 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding aftermarket purchasers have
standing if they can trace their shares to the registration statement); Joseph v. Wiles,
223 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000) (adopting the "tracing" theory for standing to sue
under Section 11); Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d 1076, 1080 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1999) ("[A] plaintiff must either show that he purchased his stock in the initial
offering or trace his later-purchased stock back to the initial offering.").
146. See supranote 43 and accompanying text.
147. Krim, 402 F.3d at 496 n.34 (quoting Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854,
873 (5th Cir. 2003)) ("[Blecause there was only one offering of Azurix stock, all the
plaintiffs' stock is traceable to the challenged registration statement."); Joseph v.
Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[B]ecause [the defendant] made only one
debenture offering, the debentures [the plaintiff] purchased are directly traceable to
the May offering and registration statement."); Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080 (granting
aftermarket purchasers standing because "the only Dignity stock ever sold to the
public was pursuant to the allegedly misleading registration statement at issue in this
case.").
148. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080 n.4; Brian Murry, Aftermarket PurchaserStanding
Under § 11 of the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 633, 635-36 (1999).
149. See infra Part V.A.
150. See infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
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This section will (a) discuss a decision from the Fifth Circuit that
rejected the use of statistical evidence as a means of fulfilling the
tracing requirement; (b) survey other circuits' stance on the use of
statistical evidence as a means of fulfilling the tracing requirement;
and (c) discuss why statistical evidence should be sufficient to fulfill
the tracing requirement.
A. Plaintiffs Left Without a Leg to Stand on: The Fifth Circuit
Rejects the Use of Statistical Tracing to Prove Standing
Krim v. pcOrder.com involved a Section 11 claim against
pcOrder.com alleging materially false and misleading statements
made in registration statements filed for two different public
offerings.1s1 "PcOrder.com conducted an initial public offering ("IPO")
of pcOrder.com stock on Feruary 26, 1999, and a secondary public
offering ("SPO") on December 7, 1999."152 All lead plaintiffs
purchased their stock in the secondary market, not during the public
offerings.153 Accordingly, the court considered the claims of three lead
plaintiffs, Beebe, Burke, and Petrick, to determine if any "could trace
their stock back to either of the public offerings."154
The Court concluded that at the time Beebe purchased his 1,000
shares of stock, the pool of stock on the market contained only IPO
stock.1ss Therefore, Beebe's stock was necessarily IPO stock and the
tracing requirement was met. 156 In contrast, the court concluded that
Burke and Petrick could not meet the tracing requirement and thus
lacked standing.157 Burke purchased 3,000 shares of pcOrder.com
stock in June 1999.158 At that time, a minute percentage of non-IPO
shares, specifically insider shares, had entered the pool of stock on
the market, but "IPO shares still comprised 99.85% of the pool."159
After the SPO, Burke and Petrick purchased additional shares "at a
time when IPO and SPO shares (collectively "PO stock") constituted

151. 402 F.3d 489, 491-92 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Plaintiffs alleged that the registration
statements were false and misleading by indicating that pcOrder.com had a viable
business plan, had an ability to generate and report accurate operating and financial
information, and was not competing with Trilogy Software for revenue.").
152. Id. at 491. PcOrder filed registration statements with the SEC in connection
with both public offerings. Id.
153. Id. at 492.
154. Id. at 492 n.2. For an aftermarket purchaser to have standing, they must be
able to 'trace' their securities to the allegedly defective registration statement. See
sources cited infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
155. Krim, 402 F.3d at 492.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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91%" of the pool of stock on the market.160 Plaintiffs offered expert
testimony indicating that "the probability that each Lead Plaintiff
owned at least one share of PO stock was very nearly 100%."161
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the district court's holding that
Bruke and Petrick lacked standing, explaining that "[t]he task before
the district court was to determine, by a preponderance of the
evidence, whether and in what amount a plaintiffs shares are
tainted" and that "statistical tracing is not up to the task at hand."162
As the district court noted, "Plaintiffs must demonstrate all stock for
which they claim damages was actually issued pursuant to a
defective registration statement, not just that it might have been,
probably was, or most likely was, issued pursuant to a defective
statement."163

B. Other Lower Federal Courts: Section 11 Claims
DisappearingWithout a "Trace"
The Fifth Circuit appears to be the only appellate court that has
ruled on the sufficiency of statistical evidence as a means of proving
tracing. Nonetheless, the weight of authority among federal district
courts rejects the use of statistical evidence to prove tracing.164 Prior
to Krim, district courts that addressed the issue of statistical tracing
universally rejected it.165 One of the earliest and most detailed
rejections of statistical tracing was issued in 1984 by a district court

160. Id.
161. Id.
The expert arrived at the odds of getting at least one PO . . . share using
elementary principles of binomial probability. . . . The expert treated the
purchase of shares as a series of independent random draws from the stock
pool ... and calculated the probability that at least one of the shares would
be tainted according to the following formula: 1-(1-PO%)# shares, where PO% is
the percentage of stock in the market and # shares is the number of shares
owned.
Id. at 492-93 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
162. Id. at 501-02.
163. Id. at 493 (quoting Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 581, 586 (W.D. Tex.
2002)).
164. See infra notes 165, 173, 175, 182-83 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., In re Quarterdeck Office Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 92-3970DWW(GHKx), 1993 WL 623310, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993) (holding ninetyseven percent probability that the shares were sold in the public offering insufficient to
establish tracing); In re Elscint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 380 (D. Mass. 1987)
(stating statistical evidence showing 82% probability plaintiffs shares included some
tainted shares was insufficient to meet preponderance of the evidence standard);
Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp 1375, 1378-81 (D. Minn. 1984) (summary judgment
granted after rejecting "fungible mass" statistical tracing method); Abbey v. Computer
Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870, 874-76 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (rejecting use of "fungible
mass" statistical tracing).
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in Minnesota. 166 In Kirkwood, the public offering at issue consisted of
1.32 million shares of registered stock issued "in the name of Cede &
Co., the nominee name of the Depository Trust Company"
(hereinafter "DTC").167 At that time, DTC already held 2.8 million
shares of the subject issuer's stock registered in its nominee name
from previous registered offerings.168 "DTC [held] all certificates,
both old and new, in its nominee name as ... [one] fungible mass for
the benefit of all its [participating brokers]."169 Plaintiffs purchased
their shares after the public offer date through brokers that were
members of DTC.170 At that time, more than 25 percent of DTC's
shares were from the registered offering in question, and since there
was no way to differentiate "old" from "new" shares, plaintiffs argued
they should be deemed to own a proportionate interest of "new"
shares (i.e., 25 percent).171 The court rejected plaintiffs' argument,
dubbed the "fungible mass tracing theory," reasoning that "plaintiffs
are showing only that their securities might have been issued in the
public offering and they are asking the court to presume that a pro
rata portion of their shares are new shares."172
Adding to these decisions, Krim appears to have provided
momentum to the trend of rejecting statistical tracing, as other
courts have elected to follow Krim's lead.173 Further, district courts
166. Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1378-83.
167. Id. at 1378-79. The Depository Trust Company "is a stock clearing house,
owned by a number of brokerage firms." Id.
168. Id. The issuer had a total of 6.9 million shares outstanding from previous
offerings at the time of the public offering at issue in this case. Id.
169. Id. at 1379. Purchases and sales from participating brokers are accomplished
through book entries crediting or debiting the brokerage firm's account, which
facilitates the transfer of securities by not requiring physical movement or a change in
registered name of any certificates. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1380 (emphasis added). The court also agreed with defendant's argument
that, under the fungible mass tracing theory, the "[i]ssuer could find itself liable for far
more than the number of shares issued in the challenged offering." Id. For an
explanation of how this argument is misplaced, see infra notes 180-84 and
accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Grand Lodge of Pa. v. Peters, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1374 (M.D. Fla.
2008) (adopting Krim's position that "[s]tanding cannot be based on statistical
likelihoods that all of the securities purchased can be traced to a specific faulty
registration statement"); In re FleetBoston Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 315, 351
n.40 (D.N.J. 2008) (thoroughly discussing Krim's rejection of statistical tracing and
drawing a distinction between the "uncertain 'statistical tracing"' rejected in Krim
from the "reliable 'mathematical tracing' at issue in the case at bar); Davidco
Investors, LLC v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., No. 8:04CV2561T-24EAJ, 2006 WL
547989, at *23 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2006) (relying on Krim for the premise that
"[s]tanding [in a Section 11 claim] cannot be based on a statistical tracing theory, i.e.,
by showing a very high probability that shares can be traced to the allegedly defective
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that have not directly addressed the issue of statistical tracing have
implicitly rejected its invocation, following logic similar to that in

Kirkwood.174
C. Adding it All Up: Why StatisticalEvidence Should Be
Sufficient to Prove Tracing
The argument that statistical evidence should be sufficient to
establish tracing is supported by three concepts. First, tracing has
been framed as an issue of standing.175 Accordingly, any evidence,
direct or circumstantial, that can establish standing by a
preponderance of the evidence should be sufficient.176 Second,
allowing statistical tracing closes a loophole that would otherwise
provide issuers and other subject defendants, in practical effect, with
immunity from Section 11 claims. Third, allowing statistical evidence
to establish tracing is consistent with the purpose of the Securities
Act and consistent with the use of statistical evidence to prove
affirmative defenses under Section 11.
Tracing is a judicially created doctrine.177 Nevertheless, Section
registration statement"); In re Alamosa Holdings, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 832, 864 (N.D.
Tex. 2005) (applying Krim by stating "mere probability that a plaintiff can trace
shares is clearly insufficient" to establish standing).
174. See, e.g., Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1380-81; Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279,
287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[It is insufficient that stock 'might' have been issued pursuant
to a defective statement. A plaintiff must show that it actually was so issued.")
(internal citation omitted); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 642 (N.D.
Cal. 1980) ("Alleging or proving that the stock, purchased in the open market, might
have been issued pursuant to the registration statement [was insufficient].").
175. See APA Excelsior III, L.P. v. Premiere Techs, Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2007) ("mo have standing and prevail on a claim under Section 11 a plaintiff
must be able to trace his stock to the defective registration statement."); Krim v.
pcOrder.com, 402 F.3d 489, 495-96 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[Alftermarket purchasers seeking
standing must demonstrate the ability to 'trace' their shares to the faulty
registration."); DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A]ftermarket
purchasers who can trace their shares to an allegedly misleading registration
statement have standing under [Section] 11."); Lee v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 294 F.3d
969, 974-78 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding aftermarket purchasers must be able to trace
their stock to the allegedly faulty registration statement to have standing).
176. See In re Elscint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 380 (D. Mass. 1987).
177. The requirement of "tracing" was judicially recognized in 1967 when Judge
Friendly interpreted the phrase "any person acquiring such security" in Section 11.
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1967) (emphasis added). Judge Friendly
reasoned that since "such" has no referent, the phrase is open to two interpretations:
(1) Section 11 applies to any person "acquiring a security issued pursuant to the
registration statement" or (2) Section 11 applies more broadly to any person "acquiring
a security of the same nature as that issued pursuant to the registration statement."
Id. After reviewing the purpose and legislative history of the Securities Act, Judge
Friendly adopted the narrow reading and thus established what would be known as
the "tracing" requirement. See id; Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace:

Sections 11 & 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 431 (2000).
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1I's legislative history provides support that Section 11 should not be
confined to purchasers who can trace their shares to the allegedly
defective registration statement.178 Prior to the enactment of the
Securities Act, the House of Representatives Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce set forth a general summary of
Section 11, stating: "Inasmuch as the value of a security may be
affected by the information given in the registration statement ...
the civil remedies accorded by this subsection . . . are given to all

purchasers regardless of whether they bought their securities ... at
the time of the original offer or at some later date."179 Additionally,
the Committee observed that it is "within the constitutional power of
Congress to accord a remedy to all purchasers who may reasonably
be affected by any statements in the registration statement."180 The
sweeping language the Committee used, describing Section 11 as
applying to "all purchasers" affected by "any statement" in the
registration statement, indicates that Congress intended Section 11
to apply to anyone acquiring a security of the same nature as that
issued pursuant to the registration statement and whose value was
affected by the material misstatement. 181
However, in view of the confines of the judicially created tracing
requirement, statistical evidence should be deemed sufficient.
Tracing has been framed as a matter of standing and thus the
appropriate burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.182
As stated by one district court, "one would expect that a claimant
may recover under Section 11 if able to prove, by a preponderance of
178. Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967).
179. H.R. REP. 73-85, at 22 (1933) (emphasis added), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
Item No. 18, at 22 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Both the Senate and House of Representatives had proposed bills that would
have provided a civil remedy based on a material misstatement to "any persons
acquiring any securities to which such statement relates, either from the original issuer
or from any other person." S. 875, 73d Cong. §9 (1933) (emphasis added), reprinted in
3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 & SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934, Item 28, at 18-19 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973); H.R. 4314,
73d Cong. §9 (1933) (as referred to the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee) (emphasis added), reprintedin 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 & SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 22, at 19 (J.S. Ellenberger &
Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973). Both bills were rejected in favor of the language ultimately
adopted. See also SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 444-45 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(interpreting the word "make" in Rule 10b-5 to limit the provision's reach by
distinguishing the term "make" from the broader term "use").
182. See Krim v. pcOrder.com, 402 F.3d 489, 494 n.21 (5th Cir. 2005); see also
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1983) (adopting the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for causes of action under the Securities
Acts); see Steinberg, supra note 44, at 393; see Sale, supra note 177, at 441.
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the evidence, the purchase of some particular number of [ ] shares"
83
pursuant to the allegedly defective registration statement.1 This
proof "may be either direct or circumstantial, or both, and
circumstantial evidence may include statistical evidence."184 With
this in mind, a plaintiff should be able to establish tracing by offering
statistical evidence that proves by a preponderance of the evidence
(i.e. 50.01%) that he/she purchased shares pursuant to the allegedly
defective registration statement.
By rejecting the use of statistical evidence to establish tracing,
courts open a loophole that allows issuers and insiders to immunize
85
themselves from Section 11 liability with relative ease.1 Although
persons who acquired their securities directly from a subject
underwriter or dealer as "initial investor purchasers" in a registered
offering clearly have standing, aftermarket purchasers currently face
formidable obstacles. Today, industry practice is to issue stock in
"street name."186 With "street name" stock, direct tracing is virtually
impossible in all practicality as there is no feasible means to
distinguish registered stock from non-registered stock or to
determine who purchased a particular share of stock.187 As such, it
only takes one share of non-registered stock on the market to pollute
the entire pool and absolve the issuer, and other subject persons, of
potential liability under Section 11.188 Compounding this issue is the
ease by which an issuer can introduce such non-registered securities
into the market. For example, stock issued pursuant to Rule 506189 is

183.
184.
185.

In re Elscint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 380 (D. Mass. 1987).
Id.
See Krim, 402 F.3d at 502 (finding that statistical tracing is not sufficient to

"satisfy this traceability requirement").
186. See Krim, 402 F.3d at 498 n.42 (recognizing the "widespread practice of holding
securities in street name" (quoting Silber v. Mabon, 957 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.
1992))). Under "street name" registration, the security is registered in the name of a
brokerage firm on the issuer's books, and the brokerage firm holds the security for the
purchaser. See SEC, Holding Your Securities-Get the Facts, http://www.sec.gov/
investor/pubs/holdsec.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). This is opposed to "direct"
registration where the security is registered under the purchaser's name on the
issuer's books. See id.
187. This assumes the registered stock and the non-registered stock are issued in
the same "street name."
188. See Krim, 402 F.3d at 492 (holding that tracing could not be established when
pool of stock on the market contained .15% of non-IPO stock).
189.

17 C.F.R.

§ 230.506

(2010). SEC Rule 506 acts as a safe harbor for the private

offering exemption available under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act. Id.; Brown v.
Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 2007). The Rule 506 safe
harbor is attractive to issuers because it has no aggregate offering price limitations, is
available to an unlimited number of accredited investors plus thirty-five nonaccredited investors, and is preempted from state regulation of offerings pursuant to
the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996. See Brown, 481 F.3d at 905-
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exempt from registration and must only be held for at most twelve
months prior to being resold.19o Issuers and insiders desiring to
immunize themselves from Section 11 liability can cause a small
quantity of these unregistered shares to be sold in the public markets
shortly after the time of the registered offering. This would pollute
the entire pool of stock and render tracing by non-statistical means,
in practical effect, nearly impossible.191 Without statistical tracing, it
only takes one non-registered share to render Section 11 inoperative
as to aftermarket purchaser.192
Where purchasers are forced to rely on statistical evidence to
fulfill the tracing requirement, there must be some appropriate
means of allocating the total number of registered shares among the
various securities holders. Otherwise, an issuer could be liable for
more shares than were issued in the registered offering. The method
suggested is two-fold. First, aftermarket purchasers would provide
statistical evidence proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
they hold at least one share of stock issued pursuant to the allegedly
defective registration statement (i.e., "IPO stock").193 Once standing
is established, each plaintiff would be deemed to hold a proportionate
number of shares of IPO stock, calculated by taking the total number
of shares held by each plaintiff and multiplying that by the ratio of
IPO stock/total stock on the market.194 For example, assume an
individual purchased 1000 shares of stock at a time when the market
consisted of ninety percent IPO stock and ten percent non-IPO stock.
This evidence would establish by nearly 100 percent that a purchaser
held at least one share of stock issued pursuant to the registration
06; compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.506, with 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2006).
190. Securities exempt from registration under the Rule 506 safe harbor are
restricted securities and are subject to the resale limitations of Rule 144, which
regulates the resale of restricted securities and control securities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144;
see S.E.C. v. M&A West, Inc., 538 F.3d 1043, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2008). Subject to
certain volume limitations and information requirements, the holding period under
Rule 144 is six months for restricted securities of Exchange Act reporting issuers and
one year for restricted securities of non-reporting issuers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
191. See Krim, 402 F.3d at 492-93.
192. See id. at 492.
193. For example, the calculation used in Krim was based on elementary principles
of binomial probability using the formula: "1-(1-PO%) 4 shar
where PO% is the
percentage of PO [IPO] stock in the market and # shares is the number of shares
owned." 402 F.3d at 493 n.6. For a discussion urging the adoption of proof methods
from toxic substance litigation to Section 11 tracing requirements, see Sale, supra note
177, at 483-494.
194. This method has been referred to as the fungible mass tracing theory and has
been rejected by several courts. See Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp.
870, 875-76 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (rejecting the "fungible mass theory as a method for
tracing'); see also Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Minn. 1984)
(rejecting the fungible mass theory); Sale, supra note 177, at 488-90.
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statement and thus fulfilled the tracing requirement.19 5 Applying the
ratio above, of the purchaser's 1000 shares, 900 shares would be
deemed to have been issued pursuant to the allegedly defective
registration statement. 196
While statistical evidence has not been widely accepted as a
means of establishing tracing, the statistical model offered herein
furthers the objectives of the Securities Act without expanding a
suspect defendant's liability beyond the Act's intent.97 The civil
liabilities imposed by the Securities Act are both "compensatory in
nature" as well as in terrorem.198 Section 11 places explicit
limitations on the amount of liability a defendant may incur.199 An
appropriate measure of damages in a Section 11 suit is the
"difference between the amount paid for the security," not exceeding
the public offer price, and the security's subsequent decline in
value.200 In no event can the amount recoverable under Section 11
exceed the security's public offering price.201 By applying the
registered-to-non-registered stock ratio above, an issuer's liability
would not exceed the amount prescribed by Section 11. Regardless of
how many shares the issuer has on the market, the registered-tonon-registered stock ratio limits an issuer's liability to the number of
shares in the registered offering. Further, the issuer's total liability
would not increase as damages are capped at the security's registered
offering price. As outlined above, without statistical tracing, issuers
195. See Krim, 402 F.3d at 492-93 n.6 (providing formula used in calculations); see
also sources cited supra note 182 and accompanying text.
196. Calculated as (IPO stock/total stock on the market) multiplied by # shares,
where # shares is the number of shares owned. In this example, (90%) multiplied by
1000 shares, or 900 shares. See Krim, 402 F.3d at 493 n.6.
197. See id. at 502.
198. William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43
YALE L.J. 171, 173 (1933); see also Shulman, supra note 11, at 227.
199. See 15 U.S.C. §77k(e), (g) (2006).
200. See 15 U.S.C. §77k(e) (2006). Defining damages as:
the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the
price at which the security was offered to the public) and (1) the value
thereof as of the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such
security shall have been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price
at which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before
judgment if such damages shall be less than the damages representing the
difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price
at which the security was offered to the public) and the value thereof as of
the time such suit was brought.
Id.; see, e.g., Akerman v. Oryx Commc'ns, Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 342 (2d Cir. 1987) ('The
applicable [S]ection 11(e) formula for calculating damages is the difference between
the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was
offered to the public) and ... the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
201. See 15 U.S.C. §77k(g) (2006).
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and other insiders can avoid Section 11 liability to secondary traders
by placing a single share of non-registered stock on the market. Such
a result is contrary to Congress' intent, the structure and policy
underlying Section 11, and fundamental principles of fairness.
Allowing statistical tracing is also consistent with the stance
taken by a number of courts that allow statistical evidence to prove
the affirmative defense of "negative causation."202 Section 11(e)
expressly allows a defendant to limit his/her liability by showing that
the securities' drop in market price was unrelated to the material
misstatement (or half-truth) contained in the registration
statement.203 This affirmative defense, which places a heavy burden
of proof on the defendant, has been coined "negative causation" or
"lack of loss causation."204 Unlike tracing, courts allow defendants to
establish negative causation through statistical evidence.205
Frequently, defendants will introduce statistical evidence in the form
of an "event study" to distinguish between stock decline in value
related to the misstatement and stock decline in value unrelated to
the misstatement.206 To prevail on a summary judgment motion,
which seeks dismissal on the ground of negative causation, the
202. See McMahan & Co., v. Wherehouse Entm't, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir.
1995).
203. See 15 U.S.C. §77k(e) (2006) ("[I]f the defendant proves that any portion or all
of such damages represents other than the depreciation in value of such security
resulting from such part of the registration statement, with respect to which his
liability is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, such
portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable."); Akerman v. Oryx Commc'n,
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 368-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 810 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1987).
204. McMahan & Co., 65 F.3d at 1048 (noting that the Section 11(e) defense is
known as the defense of "negative causation"); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35
F.3d 1407, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that the negative causation defense places
a "heavy burden" on defendants); see, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve
Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 234 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that the burden to prove negative
causation is 'heavy' and arises out of Congress' desire to allocate the risk of
uncertainty to the defendants').
205. McKowan Lowe & Co., Ltd. v. Jasmine, Ltd., No. Civ. 94-5522 RBK, 2005 WL
1541062, at *12 (D.N.J. June 30, 2005) (finding that defendant's statistical evidence
was sufficient to establish "lack of loss causation" affirmative defense under Section
11); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d. 225, 229 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding
defendant's statistical evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on the issue of
negative causation); Hammond ex rel. Hammond v. Hendrickson, No. 85 C 9829, 1986
WL 8437, at *3 (N.D. III. July 30, 1986) (stating defendant's NASDAQ statistics may
provide a defense under Section 11(e) at trial).
206. Carpe v. Aquila, Inc., No. 02-0388-CV-W-FJG, 2005 WL 1138833, at *3 (W.D.
Mo. March 23, 2005) ("An event study is a statistical regression analysis that
examines the effect of an event on a dependent variable, such as a corporation's stock
price."); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (noting the
"use of an event study or similar analysis is necessary" to "distinguish between fraudrelated and non-fraud related influences on the stock's price").
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defendant must prove that the "decline in value of [ ] stock resulted
'solely' from factors other than the material omissions [or
misstatements]."207 It seems irreconcilable that statistical evidence is
sufficient to meet a defendant's "heavy burden"208 of establishing
negative causation yet insufficient to meet the preponderance of
evidence burden necessary to establish standing.
Lastly, without statistical tracing, aftermarket purchasers
ordinarily are precluded from participating in Section 11 class action
suits. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement,209 class
periods for purposes of a Section 11 class action suit must be limited
to "periods in which class members's ability to trace their shares is
susceptible to common proof."210 The requirement that aftermarket
purchasers directly trace their shares to the defective registration
statement is necessarily an individualized inquiry and would be a
significant factor in a court's determination whether to disqualify a
class under Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement.211 As a result,
a Section 11 class period, according to the Second Circuit, must end
at the time when unregistered shares enter the market.212 On the
other hand, statistical tracing is susceptible to common proof (i.e.
total number of shares on the market verses total registered shares)
and would meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). By
allowing statistical evidence to prove tracing, aftermarket purchasers
21
would be able to participate in Section 11 class action cases. 3
207. Akerman v. Oryx Commcn's, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing
Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1979)) (emphasis in original).
208. See cases cited supra note 204.
209. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). In order to prevail on class certification, the court must
find that "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members." Id.; accord Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 607 n.10, 622 (1997); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 163-64 (1974).
210. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 F.R.D. 65, 118-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
vacated on other grounds sub nom., Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir.
2006); see In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 81, 118-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
211. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 F.R.D. at 118-20.
212. See id. at 119 ("As a result, the [S]ection 11 class periods for each of the focus
cases must end at the time when unregistered shares become tradeable."). The court
explained that:
class members who purchased shares once untraceable shares entered the
market would, because of the anonymity of fungible bulk storage, almost
certainly be unable to satisfy their [tracing] requirement. Thus, common
sense requires limitation of Section 11 classes to those periods in which
plaintiffs will be able to satisfy their burden to show traceability and to
exclude potential plaintiffs whose claims would almost invariably be futile.
Id. at 119 n.402; see In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. at 116 ('I these
cases were proceeding to trial, it would be necessary for the [S]ection 11 class periods
to end at the time when unregistered shares became tradeable.").
213. See generally Sale, supra note 31, at 588-91.
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VI. PLEADING FOR THEIR LIVES: PLAINTIFFS FACE NEW OBSTACLES
FOR SECTION 11 CLAIMS THAT SOUND IN FRAUD

The objective of narrowing the scope of Section 11 has not been
confined to restrictive statutory interpretations of the Securities Act.
Rather, in the pleading domain, courts are imposing the heightened
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 9(b)") to Section 11 claims that sound in
fraud. Conversely, these same claims are being denied the longer
statute of limitations available to fraud-based claims under Section
804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereinafter "SOX").214 This
section provides a brief overview of the application of Rule 9(b) to
Section 11 claims and highlights the inequities associated with its
application. The section then analyzes recent cases where the courts
have subjected Section 11 claims that sound in fraud to Rule 9(b)'s
heightened pleading requirements yet have refused to invoke the
longer statute of limitation available to such fraud-based claims.
Finally, this section argues that granting SOX's longer statute of
limitations to Section 11 claims sounding in fraud is consistent with
Section 804's plain language and legislative history.
A. The Sounds of FraudReverberate Throughout the Pleading
Domain
Because fraud is not a required element of a Section 11 claim,
courts generally apply the relatively more flexible notice pleading
standard of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.215
However, the circuits are virtually unanimous in holding that
Section 11 claims that sound in fraud are subject to the heightened

214. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
215. See, e.g., Romine v. Acxiom Corp., 296 F.3d 701, 704 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[Section]
11 claims do not require proof of fraud and therefore the notice pleading requirements
of Rule 8(a) apply."). Based on recent Supreme Court decisions, the Rule 8(a)(2) liberal
notice pleading standard in Conley is obsolete, replaced by a more stringent
"plausibility" standard. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In
Twombley, the Court stated that under Rule 8(a)(2), a plaintiff must plead "enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (emphasis added). The
Court then dismissed because "plaintiffs ... have not nudged their claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible." Id. (emphasis added). Two years later, the Court
clarified that the "plausibility" standard expressed in Twombly governs the pleading
standard "in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts." See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); see generally Marc I. Steinberg & Diego

E. Gomez-Cornejo, Blurring the Lines Between PleadingDoctrines:The Enhanced Rule
8(a)(2) PlausibilityPleadingStandard Converges with the Heightened FraudPleading
Standards Under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, 30 U. TEX. REv. LITIG. 1 (2010)
(forthcoming).
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pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).216 This is because Rule 9(b)
applies to all "averments of fraud."217 As explained by the Second
Circuit, "[t]his wording is cast in terms of the conduct alleged," not
the required elements of the cause of action.218 Thus, Section 11
claims that contain allegations of fraud (i.e. "sound in fraud") are
subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).
In addition to the pleading requirement of Rule 9(b), the PSLRA
imposes "exacting pleading requirements"219 for fraud-based causes
of action under the Securities Exchange Act.220 For cases involving a
fraudulent misleading statement or omission, a plaintiff must specify
in the complaint "each statement alleged to have been misleading,
the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity
all facts on which that belief is formed."221 Courts thus far have held

216. Accord Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applies to Section 11 and providing
cases from other circuits in support of this position); Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings,
Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997) (dictum) ("Assuming without deciding" that
"the [Section] 11 claim in the case at bar . . . does not trigger Rule 9(b) scrutiny"
because it "is not premised on fraud."); In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 140405 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[The particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to claims
brought under Section 11 when . . . they are grounded in fraud."); Shaw v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1223 (1st Cir. 1996) (dictum) (noting that Rule 9(b) would
probably apply to Section 11 claims based on "allegations in a single complaint of a
unified course of fraudulent conduct"); Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1994) (finding that Rule 9(b) applies when "Securities Act claims are grounded in
fraud rather than negligence"); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 288 (3d Cir.
1992) (stating Rule 9(b) applies when Section 11 claims are grounded in fraud); Sears
v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
Rule 9(b) standard that applied to their Securities Act claim); but see In re
Nationsmart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 314-15 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding Rule 9(b)
does not apply to Section 11 claims, reasoning "a pleading standard which requires a
party to plead particular facts to support a cause of action that does not include fraud
or mistake as an element comports neither with Supreme Court precedent nor with
the liberal system of 'notice pleading"').
217. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); see Rombach, 355 F.3d at 171.
218. See Rombach, 355 F.3d at 171 (emphasis added).
219. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2007).
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006).
221. Id. Where a cause of action is predicated upon a showing of a required state of
mind (i.e. scienter), a plaintiff must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean "an
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent"
based on a "comparative evaluation" of inferences urged by plaintiff, as well as
competing inferences rationally drawn from the facts alleged. Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at
314.
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that the exacting pleading requirements of the PSLRA do not apply
to Section 11 claims that sound in fraud.222 However, the level of

specificity required by many courts to comply with Rule 9(b) creates a
pleading burden that is relatively equivalent to the pleading
requirements of the PSLRA.223 For example, the Second Circuit
explained that in order to comply with Rule 9(b), "the complaint
must: (1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were
fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the

statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were
fraudulent."224 While this standard was initially used to describe the
pleading requirement for violations of Section 10(b), courts now apply
this same standard to Section 11 claims that sound in fraud.225
Courts have expressed varying explanations of when a Section
11 claim is said to "sound in fraud." The issue most frequently arises
when a plaintiff uses the exact same factual allegations to allege
222. See Rubke v. Capital Bancorp Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Although the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA do not apply to
[S]ection 11 claims, plaintiffs are required to allege their claims with increased
particularity under [Rule 9(b)] if their complaint sounds in fraud.") (internal citations
omitted); Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 163 (3d Cir.
2004); Romine v. Acxiom Corp., 296 F.3d 701, 704-05 (8th Cir. 2002); In re Shoretel
Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C 08-00271 CRB, 2009 WL 248326, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009);
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
223. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 290 (2d Cir. 2006); accord Swartz v.
KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to
identify "time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the
identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.") (quoting Edwards v. Marin Park,
Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir, 2004)); In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
438 F.3d 256, 270 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to plead (1) a specific
false representation of material fact; (2) knowledge by the person who made it of its
falsity; (3) ignorance of its falsity by the person to whom it was made; (4) the intention
that it should be acted upon; and (5) that the plaintiff acted upon it to his [or her]
damage."); ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 349-50 (5th Cir.
2002) ("[A]rticulating the elements of fraud with particularity requires a plaintiff to
specify the statements contended to be fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when
and where they statements were made, and explain why the statements were
fraudulent.") (quoting Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir.
1997)); Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that
to comply with Rule 9(b) "the complaint must: (1) specify the statements that the
plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when
the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent").
224. Lerner, 459 F.3d at 290 (quoting Mills, 12 F.3d at 1175); see cases cited supra
note 223.
225. See Lin v. Interactive Brokers Group, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Miller v. Lazard, Ltd., 473 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re
White Elec. Designs Corp. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 2d 754, 762, 777-79 (D. Ariz. 2006);
In re BellSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2005); see also
In re Suprema Specialties, 438 F.3d at 270 (implying that the five elements required to
be plead under the Third Circuit's interpretation of Rule 9(b) would also apply to
Section 11 claims that sound in fraud).
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violations of Section 11 and Section 10(b).226 As described by the
Ninth Circuit, a Section 11 claim sounds in fraud when it alleges a
"unified course of fraudulent conduct and rel[ies] entirely on that
course of conduct as the basis of a claim."227 Notably, the Eleventh
Circuit has embraced a harsh view on when Section 11 claims sound
in fraud. That circuit applies Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading
requirements to a Section 11 claim where the misrepresentation at
issue in the Section 11 claim was "also the beginning of-or
otherwise part of-the predicate fraud. . . claim."228 The court stated
that pleading the fraud and non-fraud claims in the alternative is
insufficient to relieve the Section 11 claim from the requirements of
Rule 9(b).229 In other words, if the misstatement giving rise to a
Section 11 claim "is part and parcel" of the fraud claim, it is subject
to Rule 9(b).230
Based on the Eleventh Circuit's approach, Section 11 claims
properly pled in accordance with Rule 8(a)(2) will fail if the court
believes they are sufficiently related to an alternately pled Section
10(b) claim. For example, a situation can arise where a company's
registration statement contains a material misstatement that the
company's directors knowingly make. These facts give rise to both a
Section 11 claim and a Section 10(b) claim. Should the court find that
the material misstatement is "the beginning of - or otherwise part of
the fraud claim, the Section 11 claim would be subject to Rule 9(b)'s
pleading requirements."231 This is true even if the Section 11 claim is
pled in the alternative and explicitly stated as a non-fraud claim.232
In essence, as seemingly construed, the only way the Section 11 claim
can escape the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) as
expounded under this approach is for the plaintiff to abandon the
Section 10(b) claim. Given Section 1I's onerous tracing requirement,
as discussed in the preceding section, this alternative is not feasible
in the class action setting.233
Circuits that embrace a less rigid approach than the Eleventh

226. See Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009).
227. In re Metro. Sec. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1278 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (quoting
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also In re
Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating a Section 11 claim sounds
in fraud where it makes a wholesale adoption of the facts underlying the fraud claim).
228. Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006).
229. Id.
230. Id. ("[I]f the plaintiffs are claiming that the § 11 or §12(a)(2) misrepresentation
is part and parcel of a larger fraud, ... plaintiffs must plead with particularity.").
231. Id.
232. Id. ("Nor is it enough to present a general disclaimer in an attempt to
immunize the nonfraud claims from the Rule 9 requirements. . .
233. See supranotes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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Circuit still leave plaintiffs with little solace. The Fifth Circuit, for
example, applies Rule 9(b) to Section 11 claims that sound in fraud,
but recognizes that an inadequate averment of fraud does not mean
that a Section 11 claim has failed to be stated.234 "The proper route is
to disregard" the inadequate averments of fraud and ascertain if a
Section 11 "claim has been stated."235 However, the "district court is
not required to "sift through allegations of fraud in search of some
lesser included claim."236 It may dismiss the Section 11 claim.237
The examples above highlight the onerous burden placed on
plaintiffs by imposing the heightened pleading requirements of Rule
9(b) to Section 11 claims. Further, applying Rule 9(b) to Section 11
claims is inconsistent with the purpose of the Securities Act and
inconsistent with both the text and purpose of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.238 Nonetheless, if courts burden plaintiffs with Rule
9(b) pleading requirements for Section 11 claims that sound in fraud,
they should also avail plaintiffs of the longer statute of limitations
set forth by SOX.
B. Statute of Limitations: Courts Place Limitations on When a
Section 11 Claim Can Sound in Fraud
Generally, Section 11 claims are governed by the one-year
statute of limitations and three-year statute of repose set forth in
Section 13 of the Securities Act.239 In 2002, Congress passed SOX,
which included, among other provisions, a two-year statute of
limitations and five-year statute of repose for securities law
violations that involve "a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or
contrivance."240 The substantial weight of authority holds that
Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereinafter "Section
804") is inapplicable to negligence and strict liability causes of action
like Section 11.241 These courts reason that the language of Section
234. Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky's Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir.
2001); accord Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 2003).
235. Lone Star Ladies Inc. Club, 238 F.3d at 368.
236. Id.; accord In re Corning Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04-2845-CV, 2005 WL 714352, at
*1 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2005); Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d
126, 162 (3d Cir. 2004).
237. Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club, 238 F.3d at 368; In re Corning Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
04-2845-CV, 2005 WL 714352, at *1; Cal. Pub. Employees'Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d at 162.
238. See generally Trunquist, supra note 34, at 12 for a discussion of how
application of Rule 9(b) to Section 11 claims is inconsistent with the purpose and text
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
239. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006).
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006).
241. See e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (citing authority from 11 cases that considered the applicability of Section 804 to
claims brought under Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 in finding that Section 804 did not
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804 is unambiguous when applied to securities law claims sounding
in negligence or strict liability.242 However, the narrower question
that requires further analysis is whether Section 804 should apply to
Section 11 claims that sound in fraud.243
This section posits that, where a Section 11 claim "sounds in
fraud," courts should apply the extended statute of limitations
created by SOX. The section will begin by exploring a decision that
addressed the applicability of Rule 9(b) and Section 804 to Section 11
claims that sound in fraud. Part two of the section responds to the
argument advanced by several courts that Section 804 is limited to
causes of action requiring proof of fraud. Part three addresses the
related argument that Section 804 is inapplicable to causes of action
that have an expressly prescribed statute of limitations. The section
concludes with part four, which asserts that Section 804 should apply
to Section 11 claims that sound in fraud.
1. The Many Sounds of Fraud: Courts Determine that
Section 11 Does Not Sound in Fraud for Purposes of SOX
Section 804 amended 28 U.S.C. § 1658, the general statute of
limitations for "civil actions arising under Acts of Congress," by
adding the following language:
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right of action that
involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance
in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the
securities laws, as defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), may be brought
not later than the earlier of(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the
violation; or
244
(2) 5 years after such violation.
extend to such claims). Id.; see also In re Able Lab. Sec. Litig., Civil Action No. 05-2681
(JAG), 2008 WL 1967509, at *23 (D.N.J. March 24, 2008) (holding that the statute of
limitation set forth in Section 804 is not applicable to Securities Exchange Act Section
18 claims).
242. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 414-15; In re Global
Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating the
language of Section 804 is unambiguous so there is no need to resort to the legislative
history of SOX); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431, 443 (S.D.N.Y
2003) (noting that legislative history should be used only to resolve ambiguity, "a
problem not present by Section 804").
243. See In re Alstom, SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (recognizing the issue of
Section 804's applicability to Section 11 claims that sound in fraud is "narrower and
unique" and requires consideration of SOX's legislative history).
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). Subsection (a) reads: "Except as otherwise provided by
law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the
enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of
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Courts have held Section 804 inapplicable to various non-fraud
causes of action arising under the securities laws, such as Sections
11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act as well as Sections 14(a) and
18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.245 However, these cases only
addressed non-fraud causes of action that sound in negligence and
strict liability, and therefore, did not address the applicability of
Section 804 to non-fraud causes of action that sound in fraud.
To date, few courts have directly addressed the applicability of
Section 804 to Section 11 claims that sound in fraud. In one of the
first cases to directly discuss this issue, In re Alstom SA (hereinafter
"Alstom"),246 the court held that the Section 804 statute of limitations
action accrues." Id. § 1658(a).
245. The following are cases where courts have found Section 804 inapplicable to
Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act and Sections 14(a) and 18(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act. As to Section 11 only: In re Metro. Sec. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d
1260, 1284 (E.D. Wash. 2007); In re Almosa Holdings, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 832, 86364 (N.D. Tex. 2005). As to Section 12(a)(2) only: Cohen v. Northwestern Growth Corp.,
385 F. Supp. 2d 935, 942 (D.S.D. 2005); Lieberman v. Cambridge Partners, L.L.C., No.
Civ. A. 03-2317, 2004 WL 1396750, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2004); Ato Ram, II, Ltd. v.
SMC Multimedia Corp., No. 03 Civ. 5569 HB, 2004 WL 744792, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. April
7, 2004). As to Section 11 and 12(a)(2): In re FirstEnergy Corp. Sec. Litig., 316 F. Supp.
2d 581, 601 (N.D. Ohio 2004); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC),
2004 WL 1435356, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). As to Sections
11, 12(a)(2), and 15: Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C
5893, 2004 WL 574665, at *12-14 (N.D. 111. March 22, 2004); In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. MDL-1446, Civ. A. H-01-3624, 2004 WL 405886, at *912 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004); Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 295 F. Supp. 2d 957, 974-75
(W.D. Wis. 2003). As to Section 14(a): In re Exxon Mobil Corp. Sec. Litig., 500 F.3d
189, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (concluding Congress did not intend to include Section 14(a)
within the scope of Section 804 because it does not require proof of fraudulent intent);
In re Marvell Tech. Grp. Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. C-06-06286 RMW, 2008 WL 4544439, at
*11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008); In re Verisign, Inc. Derivative Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d
1173, 1212 (N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Zoran Corp. Derivative Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 986,
1016-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Virginia M. Damon Trust v. N. Country Fin. Corp., 325
F.Supp. 2d 817, 822-24 (W.D. Mich. 2004); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 313
F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). As to Sections 11 and 14: In re Global Crossing,
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (holding Section 804 only extends limitations
only for actions under the securities laws that require proof of fraudulent intent). As to
Section 18(a): Reese v. Malone, No. C08-1008MJP, 2009 WL 506820, at *8 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 27, 2009); In re Able Labs. Sec. Litig., Civ. Action No. 05-2681, 2008 WL
1967509, at *23 (D.N.J. March 24, 2008); In re Enron Corp. Sec., 465 F. Supp. 2d 687,
711 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (holding Section 804's statute of limitations is inapplicable to
Section 18(a) claims because they do not require proof of fraud); In re Hollinger Int'l.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04C 0834, 2006 WL 1806382, at *15 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2006); WM
High Yield Fund v. O'Hanlon, No. Civ. A. 04-3423, 2005 WL 1017811, at *11 (E.D. Pa.
April 29, 2005). But see Shriners Hosp. for Children v. Quest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., No.
04-CV-0781, 2005 WL 2350569, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2005) (applying Section 804 to
a Section 18 claim).
246. 406 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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did not apply to a Section 11 claim that sounded in fraud despite the
claim being subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule
9(b). In support of this position, the court looked to the plain
language of Section 804, the statutory context in which Section 804
was codified, and the legislative history of SOX.247
In analyzing the language of Section 804, the court in Alstom
noted that Section 804 mirrors the language of Section 10(b), which
requires a showing of fraud.248 Accordingly, the court reasoned that
Section 804 is limited to causes of action that require proof of
scienter and motive to defraud.249 The court further supported this
conclusion with references to the Supreme Court's Lampf decision,250
handed down prior to SOX's enactment, discussed in Section 804's
legislative history.251 Secondly, the court determined that the statute
Congress chose to amend when Section 804 was codified supported a
finding that Section 804 does not apply to causes of action with an
express statute of limitations.252 As such, the court held Section 804
does not supplant Section 11's express limitations periods provided in
247. See id. at 412-18.
248. Id. at 412 (citing In re Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. Litig. 313 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Section 10(b) creates liability for any person who:
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any
securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). Compare this to the language of Section 804, which extends
the statute of limitation for any "right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning
the securities laws." See supranote 244-45 and accompanying text.
249. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 413.
250. Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
251. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 8 n.10 (2002), reprinted in 3 CORPORATE FRAUD
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Doc.
No. 85, at 8 n.10 (William H. Manz ed., 2003) (providing the following explanation of
Lampf: "In Lampf, the 5-4 majority changed the decades old practice of deferring to
state limitations period in securities fraud cases, and it adopted a national statute of
limitations instead . . . ."); see Lampf, 501 U.S. at 361-62. In addition, as opposed to
adopting the longer federal limitations period that the SEC and then Solicitor General
Kenneth Starr supported from a 1988 securities law . . . the Court held ... that the
shorter '1 and 3' period imported from §9(e) of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. §78i(e))
governed, but that fraud victims [could not raise] the customary doctrine of 'equitable
tolling."' Id. at 363-64.); see sources cited infra note 282 for references to Lampf
contained in the legislative history of SOX.
252. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 414 (basing this conclusion on
the fact that Congress chose to amend the general statute of limitations for causes of
action arising under acts of Congress and did not specifically amend or repeal Section
13).
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Section 13.253
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,254 the section that
provides an implied private right of action for material
misstatements or half-truths in a proxy statement,255 provides
another example of a non-fraud cause of action.256 The Third Circuit,
following arguments similar to those made by the court in Alstom,
found that Section 14(a) claims do not fall within the scope of Section
804, even where the claim sounds in fraud and is subject to Rule

9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements.257 Likewise, courts in the
Ninth Circuit have routinely found that Section 804 does not apply to
Section 14(a) claims because they do not "sound in fraud" under
SOX.258 In an inconsistent manner, these same courts hold that a
Section 14(a) claim can "sound in fraud" for purposes of applying
Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements.259 These cases, along
with Alstom, demonstrate the apparently irreconcilable lack of

consistency in deeming a cause of action to "sound in fraud" for

pleading purposes, yet not for statute of limitations purposes.
Courts justify their position that Section 804 does not apply to
non-fraud causes of action that sound in fraud with two premises: (1)
Section 804 only applies to causes of action under the federal
securities laws that require proof of fraud; and (2) Section 804 does
not apply to a cause of action that has an express statute of
limitations.260 Subsections two and three below will discuss how
these two conclusions are unsupported by either the plain language
of Section 804 or its history. Subsection four will posit that applying
Section 804's longer statute of limitations is consistent with the text
of Section 804 and with the legislative history of Section 804 and
253. Id.

254. 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
255. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 2 40.14a-9 (2010) (prohibiting materially false or misleading
statements in a proxy statement). For Supreme Court case law interpreting Section
14(a) and Rule 14a-9, see Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1087
(1991); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 435
(1964); see generally Marc I. Steinberg & William A. Reece, The Supreme Court,

Implied Rights of Action, and Proxy Regulation, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 67 (1993).

256. See cases cited supra notes 248-50.
257. See In re Exxon Mobil Corp. Sec. Litig., 500 F.3d 189, 197-99 (3d Cir. 2007);
Rudolph v. UTStarcom, 560 F. Supp. 2d 880, 892 (N. D. Cal. 2008) (discussing the
Third Circuit's treatment of In re ExxonMobil).
258. In re Verisign, Inc. Derivative Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1212 (N.D. Cal.
2007); In re Zoran Corp. Derivative Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 986, 1016-17 (N.D. Cal.
2007); In re Atmel Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C 06-4592 JF (HRL), 2007 WL 2070299,
at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2007); In re Marvell Tech. Group Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. C 0606286 RMW, 2008 WL 4544439, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008).
259. See, e.g., Desaigoudar v. Meyercord, 223 F.3d 1020, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2000).
260. See cases cited supra notes 248-57.
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Section 11.
2.

Falling on Deaf Ears: Was SOX Intended to be Immune
to the Sounds of Fraud?

As a threshold matter, Section 804 has been criticized as "hastily
passed[,]"261 "poorly drafted,"262 and 'likely to create significant
interpretational difficulties for courts."263 As such, this analysis looks
to both the statutory text and legislative history to properly decipher
the intended scope of Section 804.264
a.

Tuning in to SOX: Is Proof of Fraud Required?

Courts have looked to the similarity in language between Section
804 and Section 10(b) in determining that Section 804 is limited to
causes of action that require proof of fraud.265 However, that the
language of Section 804 is similar to that of Section 10(b) supports
multiple conclusions. First, that Section 804 was intended to be
limited to Section 10(b) causes of action. Second, that Section 804
was intended to be limited to causes of action similar to Section 10(b)
that require proof of fraud. Or third, that Section 804 was intended
to apply to any cause of action involving a claim of fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or contrivance. Accordingly, the conclusion that
Section 804 "explicitly prescribes its application to causes of action
. . . requiring proof of scienter and motive to defraud"266 requires a
leap of logic unsupported by the statute's actual text.

261. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, No. MDL-1446, Civ. A. H-01-3624, 2004
WNL 405886, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004); see also Michael A. Perino, Enron's
Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671, 672 (2002) ("[SOX] moved with lightening
speed through the legislature .... Unfortunately, the Act reflects that speed."); John
C. Coffee, Jr., A Brief Tour of the Major Reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SH097
ALI-ABA 151, 171-72 (2002) (noting that SOX was "[p]assed quickly" and likely to
contain "ambiguities and yield some unintended consequences").
262. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, No. MDL-1446, Civ. A. H-01-3624, 2004
WL 405886, at *11 (quoting Bruce Vanyo, Stuart Kagan & John Claassen, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Securities Litigation Perspective, 1332 PLI/CORP 89,
119-20 (2002)); Perino, supra note 261, at 693 (noting that Section 804 is "poorly
drafted," "inconsistent with express statutes of limitations already contained in the
federal securities laws[,] and is likely to create significant interpretational difficulties
for courts").
263. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, No. MDL-1446, Civ. A. H-01-3624, 2004
WL 405886, at *11; Vanyo, Kagen & Classen, supra note 262, at 119-20 (quoting
Perino, supra note 261, at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted); Coffee, supra note
261, at 171-72.
264. See supra notes 100-01, 105.
265. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 402, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see
cases cited supra note 245 and accompanying text.
266. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d. at 413 (emphasis added).

48

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63: 1

Section 804 can be broken down into three requirements: "(1) a
private right of action, (2) arising under the securities laws as
defined in Section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,267
[and] (3) involv[ing] a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or
contrivance."28 It is clear that all Section 11 claims, whether
sounding in fraud or negligence, meet the first two requirements.269
The debate focuses on whether the term "claim" in the third
requirement is to be narrowly defined. In other words, does the term
"claim" mean that "fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance" must
be a required element of the private right of action or is it sufficient
that the private right of action (which may or may not require proof
of scienter) allege one or more of these elements?270
The plain language of Section 804 indicates that the more
flexible interpretation is appropriate. The term "claim" has been
defined as "the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right
enforceable in the courts."271 A "claim" includes "all legal grounds
that are based on closely related facts."272 These definitions evidence
that the word "claim" is couched largely in terms of the facts alleged,
not in terms of the elements required to be proven under the
applicable cause of action. As such, a Section 11 claim that includes
an allegation of fraud should suffice to fulfill the requirements of
Section 804. As one court recognized, application of Section 804 to
Section 11 claims "appears to depend upon whether the particular
claim involves 'fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance."'273
Notably, the language used to describe when a Section 11 claim
sounds in fraud fits squarely into the definition of a "claim." A claim
is defined to include "operative facts."274 The term "operative facts" is
267. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47) (defining "securities laws" to include the Securities Act
of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et
seq.), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (15 U.S.C.
77aaa et seq.), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.), the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b et seq.) (15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-1 et seq.],
and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.)).

268. See Amy Grynol-Gibbs, Note, It's About Time: The Scope of Section 804 of The
Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, 38 GA. L. REV. 1403, 1427 (2004).
269. Id.
270. See generally In re Exxon Mobil Corp. Sec. Litig., 500 F.3d 189, 197-98 (3d Cir
2007); Grynol-Gibbs, supra note 268, at 1428.
271. McNellis v. Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Syracuse, 385 F.2d 916, 91920 (2d Cir. 1967) (defining the term "claim" as used in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY (9th Ed. 2009) 281 (defining "claim" as "[t]he
aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court").
272. Greenwell v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 268 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2001)
(defining "claim" for purposes of FED. R. OF CIV. P. 54(b)).
273. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, No. MDL-1146, 2004 WL 405886, at *11
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1658(b)).
274. See sources cited supra notes 270-71.
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broader than the "elements of proof necessary" to prove a legal
theory.275 Similarly, "[a] Section 11 claim sounds in fraud when it
alleges 'a unified course of fraudulent conduct and rel[ies] entirely on
that course of conduct as the basis of a claim."'276 In this example,
while the fraudulent conduct is broader than the elements of the
cause of action, it is nevertheless relevant to the claim as a whole as
it represents a unified course of conduct. A claim has also been
defined as including all causes of action based on closely related
facts.277 Compare this to Section 11 causes of action that sound in
fraud because the same facts are asserted to support a Section 11
claim and a fraud claim.278 Here the two causes of action are based
on such closely related facts that the two theories of recovery are
simply different manifestations of the same underlying claim.279
b.

History Speaks

In addition to the textual analysis, the legislative history of SOX
supports the conclusion that Section 804 should apply to Section 11
claims that sound in fraud. Courts have interpreted SOX's legislative
history as evidencing Congress's intent that Section 804 should be
limited to Section 10(b) claims and other claims requiring proof of
fraudulent intent.280 This contention is typically supported by
remarks in the congressional record referencing "fraud actions"281
and the Lampf decision.282 Nonetheless, as acknowledged by a
275. Tohono O'odham Nation v. United States, 559 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(defining "operative facts" as broader than the "elements of proof necessary" to prove a
legal theory); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th Ed. 2009) (defining "operative" as
"[h]aving principal relevance; essential to the meaning of the whole").
276. In re Metro. Sec. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1278 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (quoting
Vess v. Ciba-Geigs, Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003)).
277. See case cited supra note 261 and accompanying text.
278. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, 465 F. Supp. 2d 687, 713 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
279. See generally Grinnin v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 179, 185-186 (2008). This
case involved alleged violations of the Equal Pay Act and of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Id. at 182-83. The court recognized that "the two claims arose out of the same set
of operative facts, reasoning that '[t]he difference between the two theories . . . are but
different manifestations of the same underlying claim . . . .' Id. at 185 (quoting
Harbuck v. United States, 378 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
280. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 402, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
281. See id. at 415 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S7418-01, S7419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002)
(remarks of Sen. Leahy)).
282. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 8 n.10 (2002), reprinted in 3 CORPORATE FRAUD
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISIATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Doc.
No. 85, at 8 (William H. Manz ed., 2003) (citing the dissenting justices opinion in
Lampf that a "one and three" limitations period makes securities fraud actions "all but
a dead letter for injured investors"); Id. at 8-9 (noting that in reacting to the Lampf
decision, the last two SEC chairmen, Arthur Levitt and Richard Breeden, previously
testified before the Congress in favor of extending the statute of limitations in
securities fraud cases. Additionally, both the FDIC and state securities regulators
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number of federal courts, the legislative history of Section 804 is
vague and the same facts referenced above support the opposite
conclusion.283
Like the textual argument above, the references to "fraud
actions" and Lampf in Section 8 04's legislative history support
multiple interpretations with respect to the scope of Section 804:284
first, that Section 804 is intended to be limited to Section 10(b)
claims; second, that Section 804 was intended to be limited to
securities claims that require proof of fraud as an element of the
cause of action; or third, that Section 804 was intended to apply to
any claim under the securities laws based on allegations of a
fraudulent course of conduct.285
The first conclusion, that Section 804 was intended to be limited
to claims brought under Section 10(b), is misplaced. The
congressional record highlights that Section 804 was charged with
the broader goal of protecting "defrauded investors," not just
defrauded investors who bring their claims under Section 10(b).286
Additionally, Congress rejected language that would have explicitly
limited the longer statute of limitations to claims brought under
implied rights of action like Section 10(b).287 House Bill 3818, which
was ultimately rejected, contained the following statute of limitations
that would have acted as a direct amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act:
SEC. 37. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
(a) In General-Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
title, and notwithstanding section 9(e), an implied private right of

action arising under this title may be brought not later than the
earlier of(1) 5 years after the date on which the alleged violation
joined the SEC in calling for a legislative reversal of the Lampf decision in 1991.); id.
at 29 (stating that the new statute of limitations addresses the Lampf holding).
283. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
284. See legislative history cited supra notes 251-52.
285. See supranotes 246-52 and accompanying text.
286. See S. REP. No. 107-146, at 8 (2002), reprinted in 3 CORPORATE FRAUD
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBONES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Doc.

No. 85, at 8-9 (William H. Manz ed., 2003) ("ID/efrauded investors attempting to
recoup their losses face unfair time limitations under current law; . .. extending the
statute of limitations is warranted because many securities frauds are inherently
complex.

. .

. The one year statute of limitations is . . . particularly harsh on innocent

defrauded investors; . . . in many securities fraud cases the short limitations period
under current law is an invitation to take sophisticated steps to conceal the deceit."
(emphasis added)).
287. See H.R. 3818, 107th Cong. § 37 (2002), reprinted in 3 CORPORATE FRAUD
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OxLEY ACT OF 2002, Doc.

No. 63, at 79 (William H. Manz ed., 2003).
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occurred; or
(2) 3 years after the date on which the alleged violations was
discovered. 288
This language would have limited the application of the longer
statute of limitations to Section 10(b) claims and certain other
private rights of action under the Exchange Act.289 Unlike the statute
above, Section 804 is not limited to causes of action arising under the
Exchange Act, but applies more broadly to causes of action arising
under eight different Congressional Acts.290 Additionally, Section 804
was not limited to implied private rights of action like the proposed
statute of limitations above. Had Congress intended Section 804 to be
limited to Section 10(b) claims, it would have adopted narrow
language consistent with the proposed statute above.291
The challenging question is whether Section 804 was meant to
apply only to securities claims requiring proof of fraud, or whether it
extends to any claim under the federal securities laws based on
allegations of fraud. The congressional record does not specifically
answer this question.292 However, a review of the progression of
Section 804 provides insight. The language ultimately adopted as
Section 804 was contained in Senate Bill 2010, the Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002.293 This bill was originally
introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy and extended the statute of
limitations for "private right[s] of action that involve[ ] a claim of
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a

288. Id.
289. Courts have found implied rights of action in Section 13(d), 14(a), 14(d), and
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994) ("[I]nvestors may ... sue
under private rights of action we have found to be implied by the terms of § 10(b) and §
14(a) of the 1934 Act."); Edelson v. Ch'ien, 405 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that Section 13(d), in certain contexts, provides an implied right of
action); Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 946 (2d. Cir. 1988) (holding that Section 14(d)(7)
affords plaintiffs an implied right of action); Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987,
1003 (3d Cir. 1988) (recognizing plaintiffs standing to sue under Section 14(e)'s
implied right of action); see generally MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION:
LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES §§ 9.02-9.03 (Law Journal Seminars-Press 1994) (1984).
290. See cases cited supra note 257.
291. See cases cited supra note 118.
292. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(recognizing that Senator Leahy did not specify whether references "to 'fraud actions'
was meant to encompass only securities claims that require proof of fraud as an
element of the cause of action, or whether it extended as well to any claim under the
securities laws based more broadly on allegations of a fraudulent ... conduct").
293. Corporate & Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S. 2010, 107th Cong. §
4 (2002), reprinted in 3 CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Doc. No. 79, at 17 (William H. Manz ed., 2003).

52

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws . .. ."294 This
bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary where it was
amended to its current form.295 While the language in unamended
Senate Bill 2010 was rejected, it suggests that Section 804 was
intended to apply broadly and that each word in the disjunctive
phrase was intended to have meaning.296
Congress defined the scope of Section 804 as applying to
claims-not statutes-that involve "fraud, deceit, manipulation, or
contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning
the securities laws."297 Canons of statutory construction suggest that
"terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless
the context dictates otherwise."298 In some cases, a second word or
phrase will be added in the disjunctive "simply to make the meaning
of the first phrase 'unmistakable."'299 The context of Section 804 gives
no indication that it should be given any meaning other than its
literal meaning.3oo Additionally, the disjunctive phrase in Section 804
goes much farther than simply adding a qualifier designed to make
the meaning of "fraud" unmistakable.ao It contains four nouns in the
disjunctive and each word should be given its separate meaning (i.e.
"fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance").302 A claim involving
any one of these nouns should fulfill the requirements of Section
804.3a

294. Corporate & Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S. 2010, 107th Cong. §
5(b) (2002), reprinted in 3 CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Doc. No. 78, at 5 (William H. Manz ed., 2003)
(emphasis added).
295. See Corporate & Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S. REP. No. 107146, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., at 17 (2002), reprinted in 3 CORPORATE FRAUD
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Doc.
No. 85, at 1 (William H. Manz ed., 2003).
296. For the actual language of Section 804, see supra text accompanying note 244.
The language ultimately adopted in Section 804 also contains the disjunctive term
"or." See 28 U.S.C. § 1685(b) (2006). Congress contemplated various alternatives to
serve as the last term in the disjunctive phrase. See legislative history cited supra note
282. This supports the conclusion that each word in the disjunctive phrase was
intended to have independent meaning.
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (emphasis added).
298. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 409 (1999) (quoting Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)).
299. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 253 (1994) (citing McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1987)).
300. See supra text accompanying note 244.
301. See supra text accompanying note 244.
302. See supra text accompanying note 244.
303. See Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2597 (2009) (stating the disjunctive "or" in
Rule 60(b)(5) "makes it clear that each of the provision's three grounds for relief is
independently sufficient").
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3. An Unheard of Restriction: Express Statutes of
Limitations
Similarly, neither the text of Section 804 nor its legislative
history limit its application to causes of action that have an express
statute of limitations. On its face, Section 804 contains no language
that confines its scope to causes of action without an express statute
of limitations. Courts, however, have looked to the placement of
where Section 804 was codified in reaching the conclusion that it is
inapplicable to causes of action that have an express statute of
limitation.304 Section 804 amended 28 U.S.C. § 1658 which provides
limitations periods for causes of action arising under acts of
Congress.305 That Congress chose to amend this statute and did not
amend or repeal Section 13 of the Securities Act has been offered as
evidence that Section 804 should not apply to Section 11 claims.306
However, the placement of Section 804 is not, in and of itself,
necessarily pertinent with respect to its scope.
First, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 is titled "Time Limitations on the
Commencement of Civil Actions Arising Under Acts of Congress."307
This title gives no indication that the statute's provisions are
intended to be confined to acts of Congress that contain statutes
having no express statute of limitations. Only subsection (a), not
subsection (b)-the statute at issue here-contains such limiting
language.os Second, Section 804 begins with the introductory phrase
"[njotwithstanding subsection (a)."309 This language clearly
disconnects Section 804 from the scope limitations contained in the
language of subsection (a).31o Third, interpreting Section 804 as
applying only to causes of action without an express statute of
limitations does not comport with the judicial interpretation that
Section 804 applies to all causes of action requiring proof of fraud.311
304. See In re Aistom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(arguing that Congress's choice to amend 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658 rather than amending
the Securities Act provided evidence that Section 804 should not apply to causes of
action with an express statute of limitations); see also In re Enron Sec., Derivative, No.
MDL-1446, Civ. A. H-01-3624, 2004 WL 405886, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004); In re
Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
305. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2006); see In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d at
414-15.
306. See 28 U.S.C. §1658(a).
307. Id.
308. See id. ("Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an
Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be
commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.").
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See cases cited supranote 245.
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Notably, a number of fraud-based causes of action under the
securities laws have express statutes of limitations.312 As such,
Section 804 would not be applicable to these fraud-based claims. In
this regard, Section 10(b) is the primary private right of action that
requires proof of fraud and does not have an express statute of
limitations.313 Thus, by limiting Section 804 to causes of action
requiring proof of fraud and to causes of action without an express
statute of limitations, courts effectively limit Section 804 to claims
brought under Section 10(b). As discussed above, had this been
Congress's intent, there would have been no need to use such broad
language or to make an amendment that affects eight different acts.

C. Striking a Chord: The Case for Applying Section 804 to
Section 11 Claims that Sound in Fraud
The preceding discussion explains why Section 804 should be
applied flexibly to any violation of the securities laws based on
allegations of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance irrespective
of whether the cause of action has an express statute of limitations.
Since Section 11 causes of action that sound in fraud come within
this criteria, they should be afforded the longer statute of limitations
provided by Section 804. As the Report from the Senate Committee of
the Judiciary recognized, The Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002 was designed to "prevent and punish
corporate and criminal fraud, protect the victims of such fraud, . . .
and hold wrongdoers accountable for their actions."314 Defrauded
investors who choose to bring their claims under Section 11 qualify
as victims of corporate fraud and fall within the category of victims
the Act is designed to protect.315
Further support for applying Section 804's longer statute of
limitations to Section 11 claims that sound in fraud is found in the
legislative history of Section 11's express statute of limitations.316 As
originally enacted, Section 13, which supplies the statute of
limitations for Section 11, provided a two-year statute of limitations

312. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (providing the statute of limitations pertaining to
the willful manipulation of security prices); Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 360-61
(1991).
313. See Section 14(e), which applies to tender offers, likewise requires proof of
fraud and has no express statute of limitations. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
646 F.2d 271, 283-85 (7th Cir. 1981).
314. S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 8 n.10 (2002), reprinted in 3 CORPORATE FRAUD
RESPONSIBLITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Doc.
No. 85, at 2 (William H. Manz ed., 2003).
315. Id.
316. See Section 11, supra note 6.
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and a ten year statute of repose. 317 In 1934, Congress shortened the
limitations periods under Section 13 to its current form, in part, to
deter strike suits3 ls and to protect prospective Section 11 defendants
from being subject to litigation for an unduly prolonged period.319
Likewise, the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) serves in part to
discourage "fishing expeditions and strike suits."320 Accordingly, Rule
9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements protect against the same
fears that induced Congress to shorten Section 11's statute of
limitations. With these fears addressed by the application of Rule
9(b), it would comport with congressional intent to provide Section
804's longer statute of limitations to Section 11 claims that sound in
fraud.
VII. CONCLUSION

The magnitude of the federal interest in protecting the integrity
and efficiency "of the market for nationally traded securities cannot
be overstated."321 Since the disastrous stock market collapse in 1929,
and the Great Depression that followed, the Securities Acts "have
anchored federal regulation" of securities markets-a vital element of
the United States economy. 322 The Acts function as a crucial link
between investors and the securities markets, providing investors
with confidence that they will receive accurate information necessary
to make informed investment decisions, and further providing an
avenue for financial redress of corporate wrongdoings. Nonetheless,
the judiciary's growing concern over the potential for vexatious
litigation has resulted in a thirty-five-year trend of judicial
constriction of the securities laws.323
Since its inception, Section 11 has played an integral role in the
Securities Act's regulatory regime. Section 11's minimal pleading

See 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
E.g. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975).
See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 402, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 78
REc. S10185-10186 (daily ed. June 1, 1934) (statement of Sen. Byrnes),
reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item No. 13, at 10186 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar
eds., 1993).
320. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. SNAPP, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 504 (6th Cir.
2008) (quoting United States ex rel Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493,
510 (6th Cir. 2007)).
321. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006).
322. See id.; Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Int'l Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 170-71 (1994); United States. v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775-76 (1979); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976).
317.
318.
319.
CONG.

323.

See generally Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740; Cent. Bank of Denver, 511

U.S. at 189; Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 161-63 (2008);
legislative history cited supra notes 34-38.
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requirements and stringent standard of liability make it a powerful
tool for injured investors. However, as expounded in this article, the
judiciary, through restrictive interpretations, is altering the very
nature of Section 11. Courts have looked to so-called principles of
common sense and questionable assessments of legislative history in
order to supersede the straight forward, unambiguous language of
Section 11. This has resulted in a cause of action that extends to
fewer investors, no longer applies to certain classes of investors, and
is riddled with uncertainty at the pleading stage.
APA Excelsior III and its lineage introduced the "impossibility of
reliance" as an unprecedented ground for dismissing a plaintiffs
Section 11 claim. Frightfully, this line of cases evolved into the
broader restriction that investors cannot recover under Section 11
"where it is certain that their purchases were motivated by factors
other than the registration statement."324 These cases have already
precluded investors participating in Rule 144A/Exxon Capital
exchange transactions, a common capital raising technique, from
asserting claims under Section 11. Whether other classes of investors
will be denied the protection of Section 11 based on the holdings in
these cases is unknown. However, one can readily rely on these cases
for introducing two new affirmative defenses-"impossibility of
reliance" and that a plaintiffs investment decision was motivated by
factors other than the registration statement; neither of these
defenses appear in the text nor statutory history of Section 11.
Likewise, the rejection of statistical tracing has, in essence,
made Section 11 relief generally unattainable for aftermarket
purchasers. Cases like Krim represent a second generation of
restrictive judicial interpretation of Section 11. The first generation,
the introduction of the judicially created tracing doctrine, was the
first to narrow the class of investors who could obtain relief under
Section 11. Now, courts have further restricted the already
restrictive tracing requirement by deeming statistical evidence
insufficient to meet the preponderance of evidence standard
applicable to tracing. With the current securities market practice of
registering stock in "street name," statistical evidence, in all
practicality, is the only proof available to aftermarket purchasers to
establish tracing. Now, if even one share of unregistered stock enters
the market at the same time or before the registered offering,
aftermarket purchasers are precluded from asserting a successful
Section 11 claim. Such a result does not comport with either the
consumer protection or in terrorem functions of the Securities Act.
Before either of these obstacles come into play, plaintiffs must

324. See, e.g., In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 647 (N.D. Ala.
2009), discussed, supranotes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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first face the uncertainty of pleading their Section 11 claim. The
relatively more liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) are
applicable to Section 11 claims, but if the court deems that the claim
"sounds in fraud," the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)
apply. In many cases, this consequence will compel plaintiffs to
choose between subjecting themselves to the heightened pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b) or abandoning an alternatively pled fraud
claim. Not only has this approach introduced inconsistency in the
pleading domain, but it also creates inconsistency between legal
principles whereby a claim can "sound in fraud" for pleading
purposes but not for statute of limitations purposes. This
irreconcilable inconsistency highlights the courts' willingness to
impose new limitations on the federal securities laws and their
disinclination to interpret these laws in a manner favorable to
plaintiffs, even where such an interpretation is consistent with
statutory text and legislative history.

